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In this chapter we revisit the relationship between income and fertility. There is overwhelming empirical
evidence that fertility is negatively related to income in most countries at most times. Several theories
have been proposed in the literature to explain this somewhat puzzling fact. The most common one
is based on the opportunity cost of time being higher for individuals with higher earnings. Alternatively,
people might differ in their desire to procreate and accordingly some people invest more in children
and less in market-specific human capital and thus have lower earnings. We revisit these and other
possible explanations. We find that these theories are not as robust as is commonly believed. That
is, several special assumptions are needed to generate the negative relationship. Not all assumptions
are equally plausible. Such findings will be useful to distinguish alternative theories. We conclude
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21 Introduction
Empirical studies ﬁnd a clear negative relationship between income, or wages,
and fertility. This ﬁnding has been conﬁrmed across time and for different coun-
tries. For example, Jones and Tertilt (2008) document a negative cross-sectional
relationship betweenincome andfertility intheUnitedStatesandﬁnd thatthere-
lationship has been surprisingly stable over time. In particular, the paper shows
a negative relationship for 30 birth cohorts between 1830 and 1960, with the in-
come elasticity of fertility remaining roughly constant at about -0.30.1
Why do richer people have fewer children, and what explains the relatively
time-invariant nature of the relationship? The negative correlation is particularly
puzzling if one thinks about children as a consumption good, unless one believes
that children are an inferior good. An early discussion of this fact appears in the
seminal article on fertility choice by Becker (1960). Indeed, this puzzling corre-
lation was a main impetus behind Becker’s early work.2 The ensuing literature
can be roughly divided into two strands. One attacks the question from a theo-
retical point of view and ﬁnds that, properly interpreted or with the appropriate
additions in choice variables, economic theory says that fertility should be neg-
atively related to income. The basic idea is that the price of children is largely
time, and because of this, children are more expensive for parents with higher
wages. Another argument is that higher-wage people have a higher demand for
child quality, making quantity more costly, and hence those parents want fewer
children. The other strand of literature attacks the question from an empirical
point of view, arguing that the negative relationship is mainly a statistical ﬂuke—
due to a missing variables problem. This literature focuses on identifying those
crucial missing variables, such as female earnings potential. Once those miss-
1We discuss the empirical evidence in more detail in Section 2.
2Quoting from Becker (1960), (p. 217): “Having set out the formal analysis and framework
suggested by economic theory, we now investigate its usefulness in the study of fertility patterns.
It suggests that a rise in income would increase both the quality and quantity of children desired;
the increase in quality being large and the increase in quantity small. The difﬁculties in sepa-
rating expenditures on children from general family expenditures notwithstanding, it is evident
that wealthier families and countries spend much more per child than do poorer families and
countries. The implication with respect to quantity is not so readily conﬁrmed by the raw data.
Indeed, most data tend to show a negative relationship between income and fertility.” See also
the discussion in Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1993).
3ing variables are controlled for, fertility and income—so the argument goes—are
actually positively related.3
In this paper, we revisit these theories of the cross-sectional relationship be-
tween income and fertility. They are largely based on ability or wage hetero-
geneity. We also formalize a new theory, based on heterogeneity in the taste
for children, in which wages are also endogenous. For each of the theories, we
catalogue whether they basically never work (i.e., never produce the negative
income-fertility relation), whether they work only with speciﬁc additional as-
sumptions, or whether they are relatively robust to changes in assumptions. We
also often compare the results to the conditional correlations found in the statis-
tical strand of the literature. For those theories that work sometimes, we try to be
as explicit as possible about what kinds of conditions are needed (e.g., curvature
and/or functional form restrictions) to generate a negative relationship between
income and fertility. We also show what goes wrong by giving examples about
how they fail. Finally, of the theories that work and appear robust, we ask for
more. Can the theory also match the time series properties of fertility? If so,
what exactly does it take? If not, why not? Finally, we want to know whether
such a theory is consistent with a recursive formulation of dynastic altruism.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows:
1. (Almost) all theories depend on the assumption that raising children takes
time and that this time must be incurred by the parents.
2. Theories based on exogenous wage heterogeneity crucially depend on the
assumption of a high elasticity of substitution between consumption and
children.
3. Adding a quality choice by itself does not generate a negative fertility-
income relationship. The quantity-quality trade-off works only in conjunc-
tion with assumptions similar to those needed in (2).
4. Theories based on heterogeneity in tastes for children are able to generate a
negative fertility-income relationship without requiring a high elasticity of
substitution between consumption and children.
3See Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1993) for a survey. An early literature review on fertility
choice is Bagozzi and Van Loo (1978).
45. Theories that explicitly distinguish between fathers and mothers are very
similar to one-parent theories. However, to get fertility to be decreasing in
men’s income, one needs to assume that there is positive assortative match-
ing of spouses.
6. Several of the theories that match the cross-sectional patterns of fertility
also match, at least loosely, some of the broad time series trends in fertil-
ity. Theories based on wage heterogeneity produce this relationship more
naturally.
7. Extending the models that are successful at matching the cross-sectional
properties of fertility choice to fully dynamic models based on parental al-
truism is very challenging. Basic theories with wage heterogeneity do not
appear to be robust to this extension. Theories based on heterogeneity in
tastes are more promising, but leave many open questions.
Our ﬁndings may be relevant in several different contexts. First, there has
been a recent increase in research relating the demographic transition and eco-
nomic development among macroeconomists.4 Similarly, several recent contri-
butions try to understand why fertility is higher in poor countries than in rich
ones.5 Further, there is a recent literature that uses dynamic macro-style models
to analyze the interplay between fertility, labor force participation, marriage, and
inequality6—including studies of gender wage gap7 and the baby boom follow-
ing World WarII.8 Often dynamic macro-style models are used to analyze the im-
pacts of various policy changes—for example, parental leave policies, the impact
4See, for example, Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), Galor and Weil (1996), Galor and
Weil (1999), Galor and Weil (2000), Greenwood and Seshadri (2002), Hansen and Prescott (2002),
Boldrin and Jones (2002),Doepke (2004,2005), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005),
Moav (2005),Tertilt (2005),Jones and Schoonbroodt (2007b),Murtin (2007)and Bar and Leukhina
(2007). See Galor (2005a) and Galor (2005b) for an extensive analysis and a critical survey of
theories of the demographic transition.
5See Manuelli and Seshadri (2007).
6See Alvarez (1999), Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002), and Falcao and Soares (2007).
7See Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2005b).
8See Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005), Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz (2007),
and Jones and Schoonbroodt (2007a).
5of tax reform, welfare reform, social security.9 Typically, they use an “off-the-
shelf” fertility model as one of their building blocks, and need to make a careful
decision about which one to use. What may help guide this choice is an informed
understanding of the implications of the models for the fertility-income relation-
ship in the cross section. Because of this, it is natural to use successful models of
the cross sectional properties of fertility as a way to inform that choice.
This is easier said than done, however. Economists have been developing and
testing theories of fertility ever since Gary Becker’s seminal paper, but still there
is no full consensus on the motivations behind fertility choices. Here, we provide
a systematic comparison of the properties of various fertility theories. We hope
that this catalogue may be a useful step towards ﬁnding a consensus.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize the
empirical evidence on the fertility-income relationship. Section 3 describes a ba-
sic model with wage heterogeneity. Section 4 develops a new theory based on
preference heterogeneity in the desire to have children which generates endoge-
nous wage heterogeneity. Section 5 adds quality to the basic model. In Section 6
we depart from the simplest framework and analyze more realistic theories with
two parents. We investigate whether theories are robust to allowing parents to
hire nannies in Section 7. Section 8 pushes several of the working theories to
also address the secular decline in fertility, while Section 9 concludes. The Ap-
pendix analyzes the extent to which our results apply to a dynastic formulation
of fertility.
2 Data on Fertility and Income
A robust fact about fertility is that it is decreasing in income. This fact has been
documented from a time-series point of view, across countries, and across indi-
viduals. Quoting from Becker (1960) (p. 217): “Indeed, most data tend to show
a negative relationship between income and fertility. This is true of the Census
data for 1910, 1940 and 1950, where income is represented by father’s occupation,
9Recent contributions include Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000), Erosa, Fuster, and
Restuccia (2005a), Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005), Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles
(2003), Sylvester (2007), and Zhao (2008).
6mother’s education or monthly rental; the data from the Indianapolis survey,
the data for nineteenth century Providence families, and several other studies as
well.”10
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Source: Jones and Tertilt (2008)
In a recent study, Jones and Tertilt (2008) use U. S. Census Data on lifetime
fertility and occupations to document this negative cross-sectional relationship
in the United States.11 They ﬁnd a robust negative cross-sectional relationship
between husband’s income12 and fertility for all cohorts for which data is avail-
10The studies Becker is referring to are U.S. Census (1945), U.S. Census (1955), Whelpton and
Kiser (1951), and Jaffe (1940).
11Income is based on the median annual income for a given occupation in 1950 and adjusted
for TFP growth. A measure of income based on occupation is a better measure of lifetime income
than income in any particular year. See Ruggles, Sobek, Alexander, Fitch, Goeken, Hall, King,
and Ronnander (2004) for a description of how occupational income scores (OIS) are constructed
as well as its robustness as a proxy for income. See Jones and Tertilt (2008) for a description of
how the OIS was converted into 2000 dollars.
12The focus on husband’s income allows a consistent analysis over time. In particular, it allows
the analysis of periods for which data on wife’s income is practically nonexistent.
7able, that is for women born between 1826 and 1960.13 Not only are the correla-
tions always negative, but also they are surprisingly similar in magnitude over
time. Figure 1, reproduced from their paper, shows this very clearly. While the
relationship is not perfect, it seems that most of the fertility decline over time can
be “explained” by rising incomes alone, at least in a statistical sense.
To give a sense of the magnitudes, Table 1 reproduces some of the most rel-
evant numbers from Jones and Tertilt (2008). For a selected number of birth co-
horts, the table displays average husband’s income and average fertility.14 To
quantify the fertility-income relationship, two different empirical measures were
constructed: the income elasticity of fertility, and the fertility gap between the top
and bottom 50 percent of the income distribution. The income elasticity roughly
hovers around minus one-third, meaning that for a family with an income that is
10% higher than another family, the number of children is about 3% lower. This
is a large difference. For example, for women born during the 19th century, those
in the bottom half of the income distribution had easily one child more on aver-
age than those in the top half. Today, the difference is is much smaller in absolute
numbers, with a fertility gap of roughly a quarter of a child. But since fertility
is signiﬁcantly lower for all women, the income elasticity has declined only very
mildly over time, to about -0.20 for the most recent cohorts.
Note that the income measure used in Figure 1 and Table 1 is based on occu-
pations, and can also be viewed as a proxy for wages. Therefore, the ﬁndings can
be interpreted as showing a negative fertility-wage relationship.
Many other studies have documented this kind of relationship, typically for
a speciﬁc geographic area at a particular point in time. For example, Borg (1989)
ﬁnds a negative relationship using panel data from South Korea in 1976, and
13Fertility is measured as children ever born (CEB) to the current wife. Of course, this measure
could differ from male completed fertility if men had children with different women. Unfortu-
nately not much data on male completed fertility are available. We are aware of two exceptions.
First, the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth asked men and women independently about
their fertility. Preston and Sten (2008) use this data to construct a measure of the elasticity of
male fertility to male education and also ﬁnd a negative coefﬁcient. Given that divorce was rare
for most of the period under consideration, we believe that the wife’s fertility is a good proxy.
Second, Shiue (2008) compiled Chinese data from 1300 to 1850. She ﬁnds a weak positive rela-
tionship between male fertility and social status, but since richer men also had more women on
average, fertility per wife is actually decreasing.
14The deﬁnitions of fertility and income in the table are identical to those used in Figure 1.
8Birth Cohort Income top/bottom Fertility Annual income Number of
elasticity fertility gap in 2000 Dollar observations
1826-1830 -0.33 0.95 5.59 4,154 452
1836-1840 -0.20 0.74 5.49 5,064 1,960
1846-1850 -0.32 1.26 5.36 6,173 4,520
1856-1860 -0.35 1.24 4.90 7,525 7,241
1866-1870 -0.34 1.27 4.50 9,173 7,347
1876-1880 -0.42 1.06 3.25 11,182 3,203
1886-1890 -0.45 1.05 3.15 13,631 6,644
1896-1900 -0.50 0.93 2.82 16,616 8,462
1906-1910 -0.42 0.57 2.30 20,255 11,812
1916-1920 -0.25 0.34 2.59 24,690 46,908
1926-1930 -0.17 0.27 3.11 30,097 97,143
1936-1940 -0.19 0.31 3.01 36,688 44,428
1946-1950 -0.20 0.26 2.22 44,723 62,210
1956-1960 -0.22 0.23 1.80 54,517 71,517
Source: Jones and Tertilt (2008)
Table 1: Fertility-Income Relationship for 14 U.S. Cross Sections
Docquier (2004) documents a similar relationship for the U.S. using data from
the PSID in 1994. Westoff (1954) ﬁnds a negative relationship between fertility
and occupational status for the years 1900-1952 using U.S. Census data.
Part of the literature argues that a negative income-fertility relationship is pri-
marily a statistical ﬂuke—i.e., that it is due to a problem of missing variables. The
idea is that once enough variables are controlled for, one would actually ﬁnd a
positive income-fertility relation. Indeed, this was Becker’s original view on the
topic. He went into great detail focusing on knowledge of the proper use of con-
traceptives as the important missing variable.15 Similarly, many authors have
argued that a distinction between male and female income is crucial and that the
relationship between male income and fertility is indeed (weakly) positive once
one correctly controls for female income.16 Authors of studies that ﬁnd a positive
15He showed that, in his sample, in those households that were actively engaged in family
planning, fertility and income were positively related while the opposite was true for families
not engaged in family planning. Other early papers along this line are cited by Becker in his
original piece. They include Edin and Hutchinson (1935) and Banks (1955).
16Empirical studies distinguishing explicitly between husbands and wives include Cho (1968),
Fleischer and Rhodes (1979),Freedman and Thorton (1982),Schultz (1986), Heckman and Walker
(1990), Merrigan and Pierre (1998), Blau and van der Klaauw (2007), and Jones and Tertilt (2008).
9relationship after controlling for women’s wages, often interpret such ﬁnding as
having resolved the “puzzle.” This is, however, not necessarily the case. The
reason is that even though the ﬁnding reconciles the conditional correlations in
the data with the simplest model of fertility, the question remains of what kind
of theories would explain the unconditional negative correlation of men’s wages
and fertility. At the very least it requires some assumptions about matching.17
In this paper we take a somewhat different approach: rather than controlling for
important factors (such as wives’ wages) in the data, we try to add such impor-
tant factors into the model and then ask whether the augmented model delivers
the same qualitative facts as the data does.
It is sometimes argued that early on in the development process, a positive
relationship between income and fertility existed.18 Most of the studies that doc-
ument such a positive relationship are set in agrarian economies, and often in-
come is proxied by farm size. Examples include Simon (1977, chapter 16), who
documents a positive relationship between farm size in hectares and the average
numbers of children born for rural areas in Poland in 1948, and Clark and Hamil-
ton (2006), who document a positive relationship between occupational status
and the number of surviving children in England in the late 16th and early 17th
century (see also Clark (2005) and Clark (2007)). Weir (1995) ﬁnds a weakly pos-
itive relationship between economic status and fertility in 18th century France,
while Wrigley (1961) and Haines (1976) document higher fertility in the coal min-
ing areas of France and Prussia than in surrounding agricultural areas during the
end of the 19th century. Also, Lee (1987) documents a similar ﬁnding using data
from the U.S. and Canada.19 This body of work suggests that the fundamental
forces determining the demand for children might be different in areas where
agriculture is the primary economic activity.
Of course, there is no reason why the fertility-income relationship should not
The ﬁndings are mixed.
17We discuss this in detail in Section 6.
18A more recent version of such a positive relationship is that U.S. fertility is higher than most
other countries in the OECD even though U.S. income is higher. This does not hold for a larger
set of countries, however. See Ahn and Mira (2002) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2007) for a dis-
cussion of relatedpoints. Bongaarts (2003)ﬁnds a slight U-shapedfertility-educationrelationship
in Portugal and Greece using three education levels of women. The other eight countries concur
with previous ﬁndings of a strictly negative relationship.
19See also the papers cited in Lee (1987).
10change over time or vary in different cross sections. It may be that in some sub-
groups of the population, fertility increases in income once all other relevant cor-
relates are controlled for, while in other subgroups the primary change across
the income distribution is in the price of a child and, because of this, that fertil-
ity is lower at higher income levels. And in fact, it is plausible that fertility and
wealth were indeed positively related in early agrarian economies, but that this
relationship was reversed after industrialization.20
To sum up, the fact that people with higher lifetime earnings have fewer chil-
dren seems very robust, at least during the last century and a half in the United
States. Other countries and other episodes display a similar relationship. In-
spired by these facts, this paper analyzes which theories of fertility are consistent
with this relationship.
3 Basic Framework and Results
In this section we introduce notation and explore some basic models of fertility
choice. The basic examples that we discuss here focus on the roles played by the
nature of the cost of children, the sources of family income and the formulation
of preferences. We ﬁnd that the simplest versions of these ideas do not generate
a negative relationship between fertility and income. Special assumptions on the
nature of costs of children, the utility function, the sources of income and/or
the child quality production function are needed. This it not to say that these
theories are wrong. Rather, by making explicit the assumptions behind the ideas
we hope to facilitate the testing of the theories and, ultimately, to improve our
understanding of fertility decision-making.
To keep the analysis tractable, we focus on a static, monoparental set-up. This
approach allows for closed form solutions and lets us focus on the basic mechan-
ics behind the results. Obviously, there are many dynamic elements in real world
fertility-decision making, for example, choices about the timing of births, etc. We
20For example, Skirbekk (2008) (using a large data set including various world regions over
time) ﬁnds that as fertility declines, there is a general shift from a positive to a negative or neutral
status-fertility relation. Those with high income/wealth or high occupation/social class switch
from having relatively many to fewer or the same number of children as others. Education,
however, depresses fertility for as long as this relation is observed (early 20th century).
11see our basic examples as a way to gain insights into modeling ingredients of
more complex dynamic models. Clearly, many important features are left out
in the simplest example we start with. Some of these features are particularly
important and we come back to those in later sections of this paper. One such
element is that any child necessarily has a father and a mother. In fact, many
authors have emphasized that it may be female time rather than male time that is
important to generate the negative relationship between fertility and income. We
get back to this in Section 6. In later sections of the paper we extend the model to
include more dynamic elements including limited forms of human capital/child
quality (Sections 4 and 5) and parental altruism (Appendix A).
Two more caveats are in order. First, throughout the paper we analyze only
rational theories of fertility.21 Behavioral concerns might be relevant, especially
for teenage child-bearing, but are not considered here. Second, we focus on theo-
ries in which children provide direct utility beneﬁts, i.e. children are a consump-
tion good. Note that children are sometimes also viewed as an investment, pro-
viding old-age security.22 While the investment motive may have important im-
plications for the fertility-income relationship, this analysis is beyond the scope
of this paper and is left for future research.
3.1 The Basic Model
The general static model of fertility choice that we consider is as follows. Peo-
ple maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, a time constraint, and a child
quality production function. People (potentially) derive utility from four differ-
entgoods: consumption, c, numberofchildren, n, theaverage qualityofchildren,
q, and leisure, ℓ. Producing children takes b0 units of goods and b1 units of time
(per child). We let lw denote the time spent working and normalize the total time
endowment to one. The wage per unit of time is denoted by w. In addition to
21We also abstract from costs and technologies to prevent births or to inseminate artiﬁcially.
Several authors have given these issues more thought, and we refer the reader to them (see for
example(HotzandMiller1988),Goldin andKatz(2002),Bailey(2006)andGreenwoodandGuner
(2005)).
22Examples include Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Boldrin and Jones (2002) and Boldrin, De Nardi,
and Jones (2005). Zhao (2008) uses the Boldrin-Jones framework to jointly address the fertility
decline and the narrowing of fertility differentials by income in response to changes in social
security.
12labor income, we also allow for non-labor income, y. Finally, child quality is
a function of educational child inputs, s (we abstract from direct parental time




s. t. lw + b1n + ℓ ≤ 1
c + (b0 + s)n ≤ y + wlw
q = f(s)
In order to highlight the crucial ingredients to generate a negative income (or
wage) to fertility relationship, we distinguish between various combinations of
utility speciﬁcations, concept of wealth/income/earnings used, costs of children
and quality production functions. We now brieﬂy discuss each of these compo-
nents.
Utility: We focus on separable utilities. That is:
U(c,n,q,ℓ) = uc(c) + un(n) + uq(q) + uℓ(ℓ)
We consider the CES utility case, ux(x) = αx
x1−σx−1
1−σx for values of σx > 0. We
will often distinguish three cases: (i) σx > 1 (high curvature, low elasticity of
substitution), (ii) σx < 1 (low curvature, high elasticity of substitution) and (iii)
σx = 1 corresponding to log utility.23
Income/Wealth: We use the following (standard) language: w is the wage, W =
w + y is total wealth, and I = wlw is earned income (often also called labor earn-
ings). In most of our examples, there are only two uses of time (working and
child-rearing), in which case earned income is equal to w(1 − b1n). An interest-
ing special case is the case where all income is labor income, y = 0 and W = w.
In several examples, we focus on the fertility-earnings (rather than wage) rela-
tionship. In these examples, there is no wage heterogeneity. However, the logic
underlying those examples can easily be generalized to (endogenous) wage het-
23This utility function has the added advantage that, in some cases, it can be interpreted as the
problem in Bellman’s equation for a Barro-Becker style dynasty with parental altruism. There,
the term un(n) is the value function for continuations. This interpretation is only valid for certain
choices of the αn’s however. See Appendix A for details.
13erogeneity. Wedosoin Section 4. Inthis context, the wagewill beequalto human
capital, H, and human capital is a function of schooling inputs. For simplicity,
we will omit H and say that the wage w is a function of schooling inputs.
Costs of Children: We allow for both goods and time costs, denoted by b0 and
b1, respectively. To get starker results, we sometimes shut down one of the two
types of costs. It turns out that a time cost appears to be essential to almost all
the theories and examples we present here. To see this, note that with separable
utility, no time cost (b1 = 0) and no quality in utility (αq = 0), n is a normal
good, and hence, it follows that n is increasing in both y and w.24 Thus, we will
typically require that b1 > 0. While it seems fairly obvious that it takes time
to raise a child, it is less clear whether the time spent must be the parent’s time
rather than a nanny or a day-care center. We analyze the implications of allowing
for nannies in Section 7.25
Quality Production Function: One important feature for the quantity-quality
trade-off to generate the desired relationship is the speciﬁcation of the quality
production function, f( ). We experiment with various speciﬁcations. Note that
making special assumptions on f( ) is technically equivalent to making special
assumptions on uq( ). That is, let vq( ) = uq(f( )) and make assumptions about
this function. The interpretation, however, can be quite different. With homoth-
etic preferences to start with, unless f(s) is of the form f(s) = sκ, this introduces
non-homotheticity into the overall problem (1). We will analyze quality produc-
tion functions in some detail in Section 5.
Leisure: For some of the examples in Sections 6 and 7, we need leisure as an
alternative use of time in order to reproduce the negative fertility-income rela-
tionship. For most examples, this is not necessary, and hence we will typically
assume that αℓ = 0.
24When αq > 0, the constraint becomes non-linear which complicates matters. In certain cases,
the problem can be written in aggregate quality Q = nq. In this case if b1 = 0, both n and Q are
normal goods and hence increasing in both y and w.
25We restrict attention to linear child costs. Analyzing the robustness of our results to other
child cost speciﬁcations would be of interest. There seems to be little consensus in the empirical
literature on the shape of the child cost function, however. Empirical papers that estimate the
costs of children and economies of scale in the household include Hotz and Miller (1988), Bernal
(2004), Lazear and Michael (1980), and Espenshade (1984). Taking maternal health and maternal
mortality risk into account, one might also want to argue that a convex cost function is the most
reasonable formulation (e.g. Tertilt (2005)).
143.2 The Price of Time Theory
To highlight the necessary ingredients, we start by discussing a simple example
that does not generate the desired negative relationship between fertility and
income. Wethenshowwhatspecialassumptions areneededtoobtain thedesired
result.
Starting from the general formulation (1), we assume log utility (ux(x) =
αx log(x)), no utility from child quality (αq = 0) or leisure (αℓ = 0) and no non-
labor income (y = 0). Then the problem reduces to
max
c,n αc log(c) + αn log(n) (2)
s. t. c + b0n ≤ w(1 − b1n)




(αc + αn)(b0 + wb1)
As is apparent from this example, as long as the goods cost of children is pos-
itive (b0 > 0) higher-wage households (higher w) will have strictly more children
in this set-up. This is the opposite prediction from what we observe in the data.
Setting the goods cost to zero with just a time cost results in fertility choice be-
ing independent of w – still, not a negative relationship. Adding leisure or child
quality (say, with q = f(e) = e) will not reverse this result (see Section 5).
To give the price of time theory a chance, it seems fairly obvious that a devia-
tion from log utility is needed, i.e. a speciﬁcation where income and substitution
effects do not cancel out. We thus turn now to general CESutility functions. Also,
since a time cost is essential here and a goods cost does not really add anything,
we set b0 = 0 and assume b1 > 0, but reintroduce non-labor income, y ≥ 0. Thus,










s. t. c ≤ y + w(1 − b1n)













Elasticity of substitution. In problem (3) wage heterogeneity leads indeed to a
negative wage-fertility relationship if the right amount of curvature is assumed
in the utility function. To see this, assume ﬁrst that y = 0. If the only way in
which individuals differ is in their wages, we can see that when σ ≥ 1, fertility is
either independent of or increasing in w. However, when σ < 1, it follows that
n∗(w) is decreasing.
The intuition here is simple: when the only cost of children is time, and that
time must be the parents’ own time, higher wage families face a higher price
of children. This induces the usual wealth and substitution effects familiar from
demand theory. Certainly it implies that compensated demand for children is de-
creasing. This is not sufﬁcient, however, to automatically imply that the demand
for children is decreasing in income, since those families that face higher prices
also have more wealth. Thus, it depends on which of the two forces is stronger. If
the elasticity of substitution between children and consumption is high enough
(low σ), the substitution effect dominates and n∗(w) is decreasing, as in the data.
Moreover, itcanbeseenthatthisrelationship isapproximatelyisoelasticwhen
y is small and w is large relative to b1. In this example, the income elasticity of
demand for children is
σ−1
σ .
In sum, this theory works, but not without extra restrictions on preferences.
An additional requirement could be that the formulation be consistent with dy-
namic maximization in a setting with parental altruism ` a la Barro and Becker
(1989) (i.e., parents care about number and utility of children multiplicatively).
In Appendix A.1 we discuss the relationship between this static problem and a
reinterpretation of it as the Bellman equation of a dynamic problem. The difﬁ-
culty with the dynamic reinterpretation of the current example is that αn is no
longer a parameter but represents children’s average level of utility. It there-
fore becomes a function of the wage. It turns out that once this is taking into
account properly, fertility is independent of the wage independently of σ. More-
over, Jones and Schoonbroodt (2007b) show that in this kind of models, σ > 1
is needed to generate the decreases in fertility observed over the past 200 years
16in response to increased productivity growth and decreased mortality. Hence, it
seems that this dynamic interpretation of the static model presented here is at an
impasse to get both the cross-sectional and trend features of fertility at the same
time. In Appendix A.1, we show that with preference heterogeneity, both the
cross section as well as the trend observations can be generated.
Non-Labor Income. An alternative speciﬁcation that also works is to assume log








Note that for y > 0, fertility is indeed decreasing in the wage.26 Note that the
slope of the relationship depends on the size of the non-labor income. That is, for
small amounts of non-labor income fertility is decreasing in the wage only very
mildly, and in the limit, when non-labor income is zero, fertility does not depend
on the wage at all.
Note, however, that the only income that would really qualify as non-labor
income here are gifts, lottery income, bequests and the like.27 Since most fami-
lies have no or very little such non-labor income, it is questionable whether this
should be the main mechanism by which fertility and income are connected. Yet,
variations of this formulation are used a lot in the literature. For example, the re-
ﬁnement that it is female time that determines the opportunity cost falls into this
category. In particular, sometimes y is interpreted as the husband’s income and
w as the wife’s wage. Then fertility is decreasing in the latter. We will turn our
attention to two-parent fertility models in Section 6.
Non-homothetic preferences. Another way to generate the desired relationship
is to move away from homothetic utility.28 Assume for example that σc = 0. Then
26Adding non-labor income effectively changes the curvature of the utility function, and hence
the technical reason that makes this example succeed is similar to the σ < 1 case above. The
interpretation, of course, is very different.
27Any interest income from assets that are accumulated labor earnings would be proportional
to labor income, and hence would not generate the result outlined here.
28See for example Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003).







s.t. c ≤ (1 − b1n)w









which is clearly decreasing in w for any value of σ.29 We are not emphasizing
non-homothetic utilities any further, because one broader aim of the proposed
research agenda here is to develop a theory that encompasses cross-sectional,
trend, and cyclical features of fertility choice. Embedding this example into a
fully dynamic growth model has the unfortunate property that income shares to
consumption tend to one. Because of this these models would be of limited use.
4 Endogenous Wage Differences
In the previous section we focused on theories of the cross-sectional relationship
between fertility and wages in which the fundamental difference was exogenous
variation in ability (wages). In this section, we explore an alternative view with
an alternative causation. Suppose that the basic source of heterogeneity is in
tastes for children versus material goods—some people want large families and
others want to travel the world, go to fancy restaurants and drive a sports car.
This basic difference in taste for either “life-style” affects the investment in hu-
man capital and hence wages. That is, parents who want large families will allo-
cate less time to developing market-based skills in anticipation of having many
children, and will therefore have lower wages and lower earned income.
Rather than assuming people differ in their taste for children, one could sim-
ply assume that people differ exogenously in fertility and choose human capital
investments accordingly. Thiskind ofmodel alsogets thebasic relationship right,
29This speciﬁcation (with σ → 1) is used in Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005), Erosa,
Fuster, and Restuccia (2005a) and Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2005b). Note that the income
elasticity of demand for children here is −1/σ which is close to the data for σ = 3.0.
18and is useful for understanding the basic mechanism. We start with this simple
version, even though the interpretation of exogenous fertility is not straightfor-
ward. We then move to a more general case that has a more plausible interpre-
tation: deterministic heterogeneity in the taste for children versus consumption
goods. Here schooling is chosen in anticipation of fertility decisions.
Finally, as long as raising children takes time, a simpler mechanism can be
considered. Again assuming taste heterogeneity, parents who choose large fam-
ilies will have less time available to work and hence will have lower earned in-
come, even if wages are exogenous. This simpliﬁcation will be helpful in subse-
quent sections. Note that whenever the simple mechanism works and one can
generate a negative fertility-income relationship, it is straightforward to also gen-
erate a negative fertility-wage relationship by adding endogenous human capital
investments to the model.
4.1 Exogenous Fertility and Endogenous Wages
The simplest version illustrating the mechanism we want to focus on is one
where fertility is exogenously different across people. Let ¯ ni be the number of
children that are attached to adult i. Each child requires b1 units of parental time.
The parent solves one lifetime maximization problem by choosing how much
time (net of child-rearing time) to allocate to schooling vs. earning wages. Even
though we write this as a one-period problem, the decisions are best interpreted
in a sequential fashion: time is ﬁrst spent on schooling, ls, which determines fu-
ture human capital als. Normalizing the wage per unit of human capital to one,
als is also the wage, so that total lifetime income simply becomes wlw = alslw.





















1 − b1¯ ni
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(1 − b1¯ ni)
Note that the derived negative relationship is quite robust, i.e. it does not depend
on speciﬁc functional forms or parameter restrictions. The only crucial assump-
tion is that it takes time to raise children.
One interpretation of this example is that people are ex-ante identical, but are
exposed to stochastic fertility shocks (e.g., birth control failures). Then, ex-post,
people will have different fertility realizations, which leads them to optimally
invest different amounts into human capital. However, for such shocks to be the
main driving force behind the negative fertility-income relationship, it would
need to be the case that most people know their fertility realizations before they
make their human capital accumulation decisions. While this seems implausible
for schooling decisions, itismore plausible for humancapital that isaccumulated
on the job through experience. Exogenous fertility shocks may also be important
for some margins, such as drop-out decisions for girls that become pregnant in
high school.
4.2 Endogenous Fertility and Endogenous Wages
Next, we extend the basic intuition given above to allow for both the choice of
fertility and the endogenous determination of wages. Assume now that parents
differ in their preferences for children, i.e. some people value children more than
others. To do this, we add a fertility choice to problem (5) and allow for prefer-
ence heterogeneity. We also generalize the model along two other dimensions,
which will turn out to be useful later on. First, following Ben-Porath (1976) and
Heckman (1976) we allow for decreasing returns in the human capital accumula-
tion process: w = alνs
s , νs ∈ (0,1]. Second, we allow for decreasing returns when
working. That is, an individual working lw units (hours/weeks/years) will earn
a total income of wlνw
w , νw ∈ (0,1]. While this formulation is non-standard (i.e.
20most of the literature assumes that income is linear in hours worked), we ﬁnd it
quite plausible since many jobs pay a premium for full time work. Note also that
setting νw = 1 gives the standard model in which income is the product of an
















































It follows immediately that ls = νs
νwlw. Using this, the optimal amount of work



















It is easy to derive closed form solutions for two special cases: (i) constant
returns to scale (νw+νs = 1) and a general σ and (ii) general production function,

















αn + (νs + νw)αc
￿
30We analyze case (i) with dynastic altruism in Appendix A.2.






which increases monotonically in time spent at school. Taking derivatives with











[αn + (νs + νw)αc]2 < 0 .
So, clearly, peoplewho havea higherpreference for children will have both, more
children and a lower wage.
As can be seen from these expressions, fertility is independent of the raw
learning ability, a. That is, without differences in preferences, parents will all
have the same fertility.31
There are a couple of special cases where the implicit relationship between
fertility and wages can be solved for explicitly.
In addition to σ = 1, now assume that νw = νs = 1: human capital is linear
in years of schooling, and total income is simply the wage multiplied time spent
working. For this case, we can substitute out all preference parameters to derive
an equilibrium relationship between wage and fertility that will hold across all










In this case, it follows that fertility is linearly decreasing in wages.
A second case that admits a straightforward closed form solution is when














In this case the relationship between the wage and fertility is non-linear with its
31Of course, if in addition one assumes that σ < 1, then fertility decreases in a for the same
reasons as in Section 3.2.
22curvature determined by the parameter νs.
In sum, this direction of causation generates the negative income-fertility and
wage-fertility relationships under fairly general assumptions. In Appendix A.2,
we add parental altruism to this model. Similar results go through.
4.3 An Aside on Wages vs. Income
Here we have focused on the cross-sectional relationship between wages and
fertility when the basic heterogeneity is differences, across people, in preferences
for children vis-` a-vis consumption goods. Todo thiswe neededa model in which
wages themselves are endogenous. An alternative, weaker, version of a similar
property can be derived without explicitly including human capital formation
in the model. This involves the relationship between fertility and income. For













and consider two families that differ only in their values of αn and/or αc. As
we can see, the family with the higher αn will have more children for any value
of σ and y. It also follows that this family will have lower earned income, I =
[1 − b1n∗(αn,αc)]w, simply because it will spend more time raising children and
less time working. Thus, preference heterogeneity of this type will also generate
a negative correlation between fertility and earned income, without further as-
sumptions on elasticities, or the formation of human capital, as long as children
take parental time.
4.4 Empirical Evidence and Related Work
Empirical papers have conﬁrmed the mechanism emerging from Section 4.1 in
the data, though most research (with the exception of Angrist and Evans (1998))
focuses on its importance for female wages, or income, and has little to say about
the relationship between male income and fertility as shown in Figure 1.32 Sim-
32Nor do they say much about most of the time period we are discussing in which few women
were earning market wages. In addition, good data for IV estimation, on twins for example, has
23ilarly, the structural microeconomics literature, as well as some authors in the
macroeconomics literature, also primarily focuses on female wages. These pa-
pers address the mechanism emerging from Section 4.2, though not in isolation.
We review these results below.
4.4.1 Empirical Evidence
There is a large statistical literature that tries to assess the effect of (exogenous)
fertilityvariation onlaborsupply, experienceaccumulation, wagesand/orearned
income (see Browning (1992) for an early review). Mincer and Polachek (1974)
ﬁnd that work interruptions for childbearing have lead to large human capi-
tal depreciations. Mincer and Ofek (1982) ﬁnd that longer interruptions cause
larger human capital losses. While there is a large and rapid increase in wages
upon reentry, full earnings potential is not regained after interruption and reen-
try. These ﬁndings suggests that children have a lasting effect on income through
forgone experience, which is a speciﬁc type of human capital accumulation.33
Thesepapersviewthe numberofchildrenasexogenous. More recentresearch
has focused on identifying valid instruments for fertility, such as miscarriages
and unwanted pregnancies. For example, Miller (2007) ﬁnds that an exogenous
delay in childbirth leads to a substantial increase in earnings, wage rates, and
hours worked. She ﬁnds evidence for both, ﬁxed wage penalties and lower re-
turns to experience for mothers. Since delay in fertility is typically associated
with lower completed fertility, this result suggests that the number of children
may have a strong effect on human capital accumulation of various types.
While all the papers mentioned so far focus on female earnings and leave
father’s and family income aside, Angrist and Evans (1998) use IV estimation to
look at both parents’ labor supply and labor income as well as family income.
They look at families with two children and use the gender composition of the
existing children asan instrument for the desire to have a third child. The authors
only become available recently.
33Mincer and Polachek (1974) go on to answer the question: “Do family size and number of
children currently present affect the accumulation of earning power beyond the effect on work
experience? The answer is largely negative: when numbers of children and some measures of
their age are added to work histories in the [regression] equations, the children variables are
negative but usually not signiﬁcant statistically.”
24ﬁnd that families with a stronger desire for a third child work less and earn less.
This is true for wives alone, husbands alone and family income.34 Unfortunately,
nothing is said about hourly wages. Note that income is measured before the
family actually has the third child. The fact that income is already lower prior
to childbirth is in line with the theory above: people who want to have more
children (i.e. higher αn) anticipate working less in the future, and thus have a
weaker incentive to accumulate human capital through experience.
4.4.2 Related Theory
As for the mechanism in Section 4.2 with endogenous fertility, the structural mi-
croeconomics literature on joint fertility and female labor supply choices also
uses preference heterogeneity to generate a distribution of fertility and wages
as observed in the data. Again, the focus is on female labor supply, experience,
schooling and wages or earnings, while our mechanism is meant to address men
(see Figure 1) as well as women (see Section 6 for details). Furthermore, per-
manent taste is typically not the only source of heterogeneity in these papers.
Fixed and stochastic ability heterogeneity, as well as preference shocks over the
life-cycle, are additional necessary ingredients to ﬁt the data. Francesconi (2002)
estimates such a combined model with part-time and full-time employment. In a
similar framework, Del Boca and Sauer (2006) analyze the effects of institutions
on fertility, timing and labor supply decisions. Finally, Keane and Wolpin (2006)
add schooling and marriage decisions to estimate the effects of welfare programs
on fertility and female labor supply.35 All these papers use some version of the
mechanism described here, though not in isolation. Our aim is to contrast pure
taste and pure ability heterogeneity. In reality, of course, both may be relevant.
Finally, this mechanism is also sometimes used in the macroeconomics liter-
34Their instrument is based on the following observation. Families with two children of the
same sex are more likely to have a third child because sex mix is presumably preferred. Since
genderofchildrenisexogenous, thewillingness tobearathirdchild—in thehope fortheopposite
sex—is also largely exogenous.
35This literature is based on a combination of two basic models: Eckstein and Wolpin (1989)
who analyze female labor force participation and experience accumulation with exogenous fer-
tility heterogeneity, and Hotz and Miller (1988) who analyze contraceptive effort with taste het-
erogeneity thereby endogenizing fertility but abstracting from labor supply and human capital
accumulation of any kind.
25ature. For example, Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2005a) have stochastic fertility
opportunities and stochastic values of children, together with learning-by-doing
on the job, so that higher fertility translates into lower wages.36 Again, male in-
vestment decisions are assumed not to be affected by fertility preferences and
realizations. A similar mechanism is also at work in Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia
(2005b) and Knowles (2007).37
4.5 Outlook
While the empirical evidence seems to support the idea that heterogeneity in
tastesforchildrenistosomeextentresponsible fortheobservednegative fertility-
income relationship, this mechanism hasreceived farless attention in the theoret-
ical literature. Rather, most research starts with the assumption that exogenous
differences in income (or ability) cause fertility to vary systematically across the
income distribution. We therefore address the preference channel in all subse-
quent sections. Recall from Section 4.3 that a simpler version of the mechanism
can be used to derive a negative fertility-income relationship. For tractability, we
use this shortcut when we analyze preference heterogeneity in Sections 5 and 6.
However, in all cases, the model can easily be extended to human capital accu-
mulation and wages. We reintroduce endogenous wages in Section 7 where we
present an example in which parental time is not essential and Appendix A.2
where we build the dynastic analog of Problem (6).
5 Quantity-Quality Theory
In this section, we revisit the idea that the demand for child quality naturally
leads richer parents to want more quality and thus less quantity, what is often
called the quantity-quality hypothesis.38 This idea turns out not to be a very
36Although, this is not the only channel through which fertility and income are related in their
model.
37Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (forthcoming) analyze a similar model to Eckstein and
Wolpin (1989) with exogenous fertility and endogenous experience to account for the increase in
female labor force participation across cohorts.
38Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) use exogenous variation in fertility (twins) to conﬁrm the hy-
pothesis that exogenous increases in fertility decreasechild quality and suggest that a decrease in
26robust theory of the negative fertility-income hypothesis.
In his seminal work, Becker (1960) argued that there is a trade-off between
quantity and quality of children. Originally, however, Becker did not propose
the quantity-quality trade-off as an explanation for why fertility and income
were negatively correlated. Indeed, in the 1960 paper Becker argues, by anal-
ogy with other durable goods, that economic theory suggests that fertility and
income should be positively related, but perhaps only weakly so, while quality
of children and income should be strongly positively correlated. The intuition for
Becker’s argument is simple. While richer parents do spend more on their chil-
dren (better schools, better clothes, higher bequests, etc.), richer people spend
more on everything. They have higher quality houses and cars as well, yet no
one would argue that we should expect rich people to have fewer houses than
poor people. As a ﬁrst cut, the same logic should apply to children: richer people
would want more quality, but probably not less quantity, the same way they also
would not want better but fewer cars.
So what makes children different? Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1993), review-
ing Becker’s arguments, seem to emphasize that what might be the case is that
not children per se are normal goods, but that expenditures on children are: ”If
children are normal goods in the sense that total expenditures on children are
an increasing function of income, then the sum of the income elasticities of the
number and quality of children must be positive [...], but it is still possible that
the income elasticity of demand for the number of children is negative [...] if the
income elasticity of quality is large enough.” This is not our reading of the paper.
Our reading is that, by analogy, quantity should be slightly increasing in income
and quality should be greatly increasing in income. Becker’s argument is then
that the observation of a negative relationship is a missing variables problem,
namely knowledge about contraceptives. Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker
and Tomes (1976) were important follow-ups on Becker (1960). Becker and Lewis
(1973) argue that, once income is measured correctly, the true fertility-income
family size brought about, say, by exogenous improvements in birth control technology, would
increase schooling levels (in India). Many authors have found similar results in other data sets.
In a recent paper, Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2005) criticize these ﬁndings. Their IV strategies
generate little evidence for a quantity-quality trade-off in the sense of a causal link between sib-
ship size and outcome variables describing the human capital, earnings, or social status of ﬁrst-
and second-born children.
27elasticity is positive, even if the observed one is negative. Becker and Tomes
(1976) argue that the quality production function has an endowment component
which generates a negative correlation between fertility and income.
Below, we derive conditions under which simple examples including child
quality can generate this negative correlation without making children inferior
goods. We start with the simplest speciﬁcation of the example in Section 3 with
log utility and a linear quality production function. In this example, it becomes
apparent that even with quality choice and ability heterogeneity, we need a pos-
itive time cost and zero goods costs for fertility to be non-increasing in income.
Next, we derive the requirements on the quality production function for fertil-
ity to be strictly decreasing in wages—under both, wage and taste heterogeneity.
One example that generates the desired relation is an afﬁne production function
with a positive constant, as in Becker and Tomes (1976) together with the as-
sumption that children take time while child quality requires purchased inputs
as in Moav (2005). Various interpretations of this speciﬁcation can be used to ac-
commodate the cross section of fertility with respect to income and the trend in
fertility over time. Finally, under preference heterogeneity, none of these require-
ments on the quality production function are needed.
5.1 A Simple Example
First, we show by example that including a quality choice in and of itself does not
necessarily lead to a negative relationship between fertility and income. That is,
including quality does not necessarily lead richer people to want fewer children.
They might want more quality and accordingly, a smaller increase in number of
children—as argued in Becker (1960)—but the relationship between fertility and
income is still positive.
Suppose U(c,n,q) = αc logc + αn logn + αq logq, αq > 0, q = f(s) = s and
28y = 0. Then the problem from Section 3 is:
max
c,n,q,s,lw
αc logc + αn logn + αq logq
s. t. lw + b1n ≤ 1
c + (b0 + s)n ≤ wlw
q ≤ s
This is a version of the problem considered in Becker and Lewis (1973), while
Becker (1960) assumed b0 = b1 = 0. The constraint set in this problem is not
convex because of the term ns. We therefore rewrite the problem in terms of total
quality, Q = qn.39 We also know that the constraints hold with equality. Using
this, the problem becomes:
max
c,n,Q
αc logc + (αn − αq)logn + αq logQ
s. t. c + b0n + Q ≤ w(1 − b1n)
















Similar to what we found in the example in Section 3.2, as long as the goods
cost is positive (b0 > 0), fertility is strictly increasing in the wage, w.40 On the
39Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) write a model with b1 = 0 but a children-independent price
of quality. If this price is strictly positive, our formulation cannot be used.
40Whether earned income, I = (1 − b1n)w, increases or decreases depends on the size of the
increase in n in response to an increase in w. In the present example, we have:
dI
dw




(αc + αq)(b0 + b1w)2 + (αn − αq)b2
0
(αc + αn)(b0 + b1w)2 > 0
Thus, in this case, income and fertility are positively related.
29other hand, if b0 = 0, fertility is independent of w, while earned income is I =
w(1 − b1n∗). Again, this does not give a negative relationship between income
and fertility since there is no heterogeneity in fertility choice. Instead, we get an
extreme version of Becker’s original argument. That is, if there is only a time cost
of children, b0 = 0, then we have high income elasticity of quality per child (q
is strictly increasing in w and hence I) and low income elasticity of number of
children (n is independent of w or I).41
There are at least two ways in which this “negative result” can be overturned.
First, keeping wage heterogeneity, the quality production function can be gen-
eralized. Second, one can consider preference heterogeneity instead of ability
heterogeneity in this simple example. We consider these two avenues in turn
below.42,43
5.2 The Quality Production Function.
The next example is based on the analysis in Moav (2005) who argued that pro-
ducing children takes time, while educating each child requires goods costs. This
assumption makes quality relatively cheaper for higher wage people and one
might expect a quantity-quality trade-off to result. However, the comparative
advantage alone, does not imply that higher wage people have fewer children,
as we have seen above. The properties of the human capital production function
41It is useful to note that the time intensity in the cost of children matters (the relative size of b0
and b1) for the size of these effects. Also, similarly to the cost of time theory, one could vary the
elasticity of substitution in the utility function. We leave this part to the reader.
42We have also explored a third channel—non-separable preferences—to a limited degree (cf.
Jones and Schoonbroodt (2007b)). For example, assume q = s and solve:
max{c,n,q} αc logc + log
h




s.t. c + (b0 + b1w)n + nq ≤ w
In this case, if ρ ∈ (0,1) then n and Q = nq are substitutes in utility and fertility is decreasing in w
while the opposite is true if ρ < 0. In the text, we are implicitly assuming the case, where ρ → 0.
The substitutes case works because number of children is time intensive and hence more costly
to high wage parents while the price of quality is the same across people.
43Another way of generating a negative income-fertility relationship through a quantity-
quality trade-off is to assume that the educational choice is indivisible: the choice is between
skilled and unskilled children. This mechanism was used in Doepke (2004). In this case, low
ability people would choose (some) unskilled children and have more of them than high ability
people who have skilled children. Among the latter group, however, fertility will be increasing
in ability again.
30are also a crucial ingredient, as noted in Moav (2005).
We make the same assumptions as above, except that we let q = f(s) be un-
speciﬁed for now. The maximization problem is given by:
max
c,n,q,s αc logc + αn logn + αq logq (7)
s. t. c + b0n + sn ≤ w(1 − b1n)
q = f(s)






















w + b1 + s∗
w
(9)




Suppose, that households differ in their abilities, w. In the case where b0 = 0, we
can see from equation (9) that for n∗ to be a decreasing function in w,
s∗
w needs to
be increasing in w. But the right-hand side of (8) is increasing in this ratio. Thus
the left-hand side has to be increasing as well. Hence, we need that η′(s) > 0,
which is purely a property of f(s). An example of a human capital production
function that satisﬁes this property was ﬁrst introduced by Becker and Tomes
(1976):45
f(s) = d0 + d1s, d0 > 0,d1 > 0
44Note that unless f(s) = sλ for some λ > 0, this formulation is very similar to the non-
homothetic preference example given in Section 3 since we can rewrite the utility function as
αc logc + αn logn + αq logf(s).
45De la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) use a more complex production function that allows
quality to dependon parentalhuman capital, but overall has similar properties: f(s,w) = d1(d0+
s)γwτ, where γ,τ ∈ (0,1) are parameters. Examples of production functions that do not satisfy
the condition include f(s) = sa and f(s) = as which lead to a constant s
∗
w , and f(s) = log(s) and
f(s) = exp(as) which lead to decreasing s
∗
w .










which is well-deﬁned as long as αq < αn and d0 is small enough, i.e. d0 <
d1
αq








From this it is clear that ∂n∗
∂w < 0.
Finally, notice that this example still requires a time cost. In fact, in the case










which is well-deﬁned as long as
αq < αn and
αq
αn


















In the case where b1 = 0, conditions (10) and (11) are mutually exclusive.
Interpretation and further predictions of the model. Becker and Tomes (1976) in-
terpret d0 as an endowment of child quality, or “innate ability”. In this interpreta-
tion, one might want to take intergenerational persistence in ability into account.
If the child’s quality endowment and parent’s ability, w, are positively correlated
in the sense that E(d0) = w, then fertility is, again, independent of w while qual-
46Otherwise s = 0 is the solution.
32ity is still increasing in w. An alternative would be that in those families in which
parents have higher market wages, the marginal value of education is higher—
d1 is perfectly positively correlated with w. For example, assume that d1 = κw.
Then even if innate ability, d0, is perfectly correlated with w, fertility is still de-
creasing while education is increasing in w. This educational investment does
not require time per se. Instead, for a given amount of goods, the high ability
parent produces more quality.
An alternative interpretation of d0 is publicly provided schooling. Since this
has increased over time, we see that the predicted response is that fertility will
increase, at least holding w ﬁxed. In contrast, holding d0 ﬁxed, an increase in
income over time would cause fertility to decrease. Hence, under this interpreta-
tion the example suggests that the increase in income was more important than
the increase in publicly provided schooling.47
Preference Heterogeneity
Next, assume that w is the same for all households but suppose that people differ
in their preference for the consumption good, αc. In all the examples above, the
more people like the consumption good, the fewer children they will have and,
as long as b1 > 0, the more income they will earn. However, the quality choice, q,
is independent of αc and hence income, I.
If, on the other hand, we consider heterogeneity in the preference for children,
αn, we see that the more people like children, n (relative to both consumption, c,
andquality, q), the more theywill have, the lessincome theywill earn andthe less
quality investments they make per child. Thus, in this case, fertility and income
are still negatively related, while quality per child will be positively related with
income.
Note that this does not depend on any particular assumption about goods
costs or the quality production function. As usual, however, a positive time cost
isrequired sothatearnedincome, I, isdecreasingin numberof children, n, which
generates the negative correlation.48
47See the conclusion for suggestive simulations of such changes over time.
48Pushing the idea of preference heterogeneity one step further, Galor and Moav (2002) argue
thattheforcesofnaturalselection selectedindividualpreferencesthatareculturallyorgenetically
pre-disposed towards investment in child quality, bringing about a demographic transition.
336 Married Couples and the Female Time Allocation
Hypothesis
A reﬁnement of the price of time theory of fertility is to view the decision making
unitasa marriedcouple and toexplicitly distinguish between thetime of thewife
and the husband. In this version, since it is typically the case that most childcare
responsibility rests with the woman, it is the time of the wife that is critical to the
fertility decision.49 In its simplest form, the idea is that the price of children is
higher for high productivity couples, even if only the husband is working.50
The aim of this section is threefold. First, we test how robust the results de-
rived in previous sections are to introducing women explicitly. In particular,
we ask whether the same restrictions on parameters are necessary to generate a
negative fertility-relationship when the division of labor within couples is taken
into account. Second, we move to more general formulations that model home
production explicitly, examining the restrictions needed on the home production
technology under log utility (in the spirit of Willis (1973)). Third, we show that
speciﬁc patterns of assortative mating are needed to match the data. A richer
model also necessitates a more nuanced look at the data. The ﬁndings in the
empirical literature can be summarized as the following three ﬁndings:
(1) The correlation between fertility and wife’s wage (or productivity). Evi-
dence suggests that this correlation is strongly negative whethercontrolling
for the husband’s wage or not.
(2) The conditional correlation between fertility and husband’s wage, holding
49A related idea was ﬁrst formalized in Willis (1973) who studied the time allocation problem
for a couple in which the time of both the husband and wife are used in raising children while
consumption is produced using the time of the wife and market purchased goods.
50In the words of Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1993): “A second major reason for a negative rela-
tionship between income and fertility, in addition to quality-quantity interaction, is the hypothe-
sis that higher income is associated with a higher cost of female time, either because of increased
female wage rates or because higher household income raises the value of female time in non-
market activities. Given the assumption that childrearing is a relatively time intensive activity,
especially for mothers, the opportunity cost of children tends to increase relative to other sources
of satisfaction not related to children, leading to a substitution effect against children. As noted
earlier, the cost of time hypothesis was ﬁrst advanced by Mincer (1963) and, following Becker’s
(1965) development of the household production model, the relationship between fertility and
female labor supply has become a standard feature of of models of household behavior.”
34the wife’s wage constant. Evidence here is very mixed (e.g., Blau and van
der Klaauw (2007) ﬁnd it is strongly positive, Jones and Tertilt (2008) ﬁnd it
is negative and Schultz (1986) ﬁnds that it depends on the exact subgroup
of the population one considers; see below).
(3) The unconditional correlation between fertility and husband’s wage. Evi-
dence suggests that this correlation is strongly negative in the data.
We show that simple examples imply that fertility should be decreasing in the
productivity or wage of the wife (1) and (weakly) increasing in the wage of the
husband (2). Because of this theoretical result, much of the empirical literature
has taken the stand that the negative estimated correlation between income of
the husband and fertility (3) is contaminated by a missing variables problem—
the productivity of the wife. Since productivities or wages within couples are
typically positively correlated, a downward bias (perhaps enough to change the
sign) is induced on the true effect of husband’s income on fertility. One might
think that this effect is large enough, in theory, that any restrictions on the form
of preferences, etc., are no longer necessary. This is not what we ﬁnd in the ex-
amples below. Rather, we ﬁnd that speciﬁc assumptions on elasticity, the home
production function and assortative mating (either in terms of productivities or
preferences) are still required to generate facts (1) and (3).51 We summarize those
combinations of assumptions thatsuccessfully generate facts(1)and (3)inTable 3
in Appendix A.3.
6.1 Empirical Findings
Testing predictions (1) and (2) in the data is complicated because of the difﬁculty
in obtaining direct measures of the value of the wife’s time. Until recently many
wives did not work and even now, those that do are a ‘selected’ sample. Hence,
other proxies must be used, such as inferred productivities based on a Mincer
regression or education. The evidence on (1) and (3) are quite robust while evi-
dence on (2) is mixed. Below is a summary of the ﬁndings of three recent studies.
51Given the mixed evidence on (2), we do not focus too much on the model prediction for (2).
35Schultz (1986) estimates a reduced-form fertility equation based on his house-
hold demand framework:52
ni = β0 + β1 lnwfi + β2wmi + βyi + ǫi
where n is the number of children, wf and wm are female and male wages re-
spectively, y is asset income, and ǫ is an error term. This equation is estimated
separately for different age and race groups. The data are from the 1967 Sur-
vey of Economic Opportunities, an augmented version of the Current Population
Survey. He ﬁnds that “in every age and race regression the wife’s wage is nega-
tively associated with fertility. The coefﬁcient on the husband’s predicted wages
changes sign over the life cycle, adding to the number of children ever born for
younger wives [...] but contributing to lower fertility among older wives. [...]
For white wives over age 35 and for black wives aged 35-54, a higher predicted
husband’s wage is signiﬁcantly associated with lower completed fertility. The
elasticities of fertility with respect to the wage rates of wives and husbands are
of similar magnitude for blacks and whites, although for blacks the level of fer-
tility is higher and wage levels are lower. [...] These estimates give credence to
the hypothesis that children are time-intensive. In all age and race regressions the
sum of the coefﬁcients on the wife’s and husband’s wage rates is negative and in-
creases generally for older age groups. [...] The hypothesis that children are more
female than male time-intensive is also consistent with these estimates.”(Table 1,
pp. 93)
Using NLSY longitudinal data for women born between 1957 and 1964, Blau
and van der Klaauw (2007) ﬁnd that “a one standard deviation increase in the
male wage rate is estimated to have some fairly large effects on white women,
but none of the underlying coefﬁcient estimates are signiﬁcantly different from
zero. Several of the black and Hispanic interactions are statistically signiﬁcant,
however, and the simulated effects are in some cases quite large. A higher male
wage rate increases the number of children ever born to black women by 0.169.
52Schultz (1986, p. 91) also says: “Empirical studies of fertility that have sought to estimate the
distinctive effects of the wage opportunities for men and women generally ﬁnd β1 to be negative,
while β2 tends to be negative in high-income urban populations and frequently positive in low-
income agricultural populations Schultz (1981)”.
36For Hispanic women, a higher male wage rate also increases fertility. Concern-
ing female wage rates, a higher female wage rate generally has effects that are of
the opposite sign from those of the male wage rate. As with the male wage rate,
the effects are not signiﬁcantly different from zero for whites, but for blacks and
Hispanics a higher female wage rate has negative effects on fertility that are sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero. Children ever born decline by about 0.1 for blacks
and Hispanics.”
Jones and Tertilt (2008) also experiment with this hypothesis. Since very few
women worked in theearlycohorts, education ischosen asameasure ofpotential
income. They ﬁnd that CEB is declining in both the education level of the wife
and the husband, and signiﬁcantly so. Moreover, the coefﬁcients on husband’s
and wife’seducation are similar in size (the wife’s being slightly larger) and there
is no systematic time trend.
6.2 Theory
It is convenient to break this variant of the story into two separate parts, one in
which the woman does not work in the market and one in which she can and
does. Roughly, we can think of the ﬁrst version as corresponding to a time in
history when very few married women participated in the formal labor market.
The second corresponds to more recent history. It is clear that the critical features
necessary to reproduce the observations must be different in the two cases. We
summarize all models that are consistent with the facts in Table 3 in Appendix
A.3.
6.2.1 Full Specialization in the Household
In this example, the husband works in the market, lm, earning wage, wm, or en-
joys leisure, ℓm while the wife works only in the home, lhf, so that her tradeoff
is between how much time to allocate to producing home goods versus raising
children, b1n, or enjoying leisure, ℓf. Her productivity in home production is de-
noted wf. This setup may be more relevant to the early period in the data when
(married) women’s labor force participation was roughly zero.
37The gender-speciﬁc utility function is given by
Ug = αcg log(cg) + αng log(n) + αℓg log(ℓg) + αhg log(chg)
where g = f,m indicates gender, cg is market consumption, n is the number
of children, ℓ is leisure, and chg is the home good. Note that only the hus-
band’s leisure is needed for some of the results below. That is, αℓf could be zero,
while the husband needs an alternative use of time to generate any endogenous
wage/income heterogeneity for the husband. Given our previous results, we
assume that children cost only time, i.e., b0 = 0




λfUf + λmUm (12)
s. t. cf + cm ≤ wmlm
lm + ℓm ≤ 1
chf + chm ≤ wflhf
lhf + ℓf + b1n ≤ 1
Here ℓf and ℓm are leisure of the female and male respectively, wm is the wage
of the man, wf is the productivity of the woman in home production, chf and
chm are consumption of home goods by the woman and the man respectively.
Note that it is assumed that the wife spends b1 hours for each child being raised
(and the husband spends none). To keep it simple, assume perfect agreement
of couples: assume αxf = αxm = αx for x = c,h,n,ℓ. Further, without loss of
generality, assume λf + λm = 1 and αc + αn + αℓ + αh = 1.
This problem separates into two maximization problems, one concerning the
allocation of the man’s time and one concerning the allocation of the woman’s
time. The one for the man is straightforward and does not involve fertility. No-
tice however, that male earnings are increasing in αc since leisure becomes less




λfαℓ log(ℓf) + λfαh log(chf) + λmαh log(chm) + (λf + λm)αn log(n)









Ability Heterogeneity, Elasticity and the Home Production Function
Suppose households differ in their productivities, (wf,wm). We see that n∗ is in-
dependent of woman’s productivity in the home. If education is a good proxy
for female home productivity, then the evidence in Jones and Tertilt (2008) con-
tradicts this model implication. That is, this model is not consistent with Fact
(1).53 Fertility is also independent of wm, holding wf ﬁxed. Finally, even if the
productivity of the husband and wife are positively correlated (or independent),
fertility is independent of both productivities. Thus, fact (3) is not predicted here,
either.54 Clearly, something is missing in the theory.
As can be seen from the above, since the couple’s problem splits into two
separate maximization problems, and the one for the wife’s time looks just like
those discussed in Section 3 above (additional goods permitting), the natural next

















With σ < 1, it follows that n∗ will be decreasing in the productivity at home of
the wife, wf, fact (1). Holding the wife’s productivity ﬁxed, fertility is still in-
dependent of the husband’s wage, “fact (2)”. Thus, if wf and wm are positively
53One should note though that Fact (1) is based on evidence from the 20th century, so a model
where fertility is constant across women, conditional on husband’s income, could still be a good
description of the 19th century.
54It can also be shown that if children have a nonmarket goods cost, b0 > 0, n∗ is increasing in
wf. It follows that if wf is positively correlated with wm (which is what we might expect), n∗ and
wm will also be positively correlated.
39correlated, and σ < 1, the partial correlation between n∗ and wm is negative as
well, fact (3). This example is summarized in the ﬁrst row of Table 3 in the Ap-
pendix.
A second variation that also reproduces the negative correlation in the cross
section canbeobtained bymakingthe homeproduction technology slightly more
complex. Assume that utility is given by
Ug = αn log(n) + αh log(chg)
where the home good, chg, is produced using market goods, c, and time of the
wife, lhf with productivity wf, i.e., chf + chm = F(c,wflhf). To simplify the analy-




s. t. c ≤ wm
b1n + lhf ≤ 1
chf + chm ≤ F(c,wflhf)
Theﬁrst-order conditions canbereducedtooneequation involvingtheamount
of time the wife spends making home goods, which directly relates to fertility:











That is, time spent in child-rearing (1 − lhf) is positively related to the relative
desirability of children to consumption, αn
αh, and negatively related to the produc-
tivity of the wife, wf, all else equal. Thus, so is fertility, n∗. When F is assumed




















hf + (1 − δ)lhf
￿
(14)
We can see from the second equality that in the Cobb-Douglas case (ρ → 0),
40(1 − lhf) is independent of both wm and wf, but does depend on αn
αh. Thus, the
same must be true of n∗ (ﬁrst equality).
We can also see that for any value of ρ, if wf and wm are proportional—
wf = φ wm, then lhf is independent of wm and wf and hence the same is true for
fertility. That is, under perfect assortative mating, fertility and the wage of the
husband and the productivity of the wife are independent.
Whenthiscorrelation isimperfectandρ  = 0, the analysisismore complicated.
Let’s assume another extreme, that wm and wf are independent, in what follows.
When ρ > 0, market goods and female time are substitutes in the production of
consumption, an increase in wm holding wf ﬁxed causes lhf to fall and hence n∗
rises in this case. That is, fertility is an increasing function of husband’s wage if
wm and wf are independent.
On the other hand, when ρ < 0, market goods and female time are com-
plements in the production of consumption, an increase in wm holding wf ﬁxed
causes lhf to rise and hence n∗ falls in this case. That is, fertility is a decreasing
function of husband’s wage if time and goods are complements and wages of
husbands and wives are independent.
Thus, assuming enough complementarity between time and goods in pro-
duction, F, and enough independence between productivities of husbands and
wives, also gives a model that can reproduce the negative correlation between
husbands income and fertility, fact (3). From (14) it is also obvious that female
and male productivities enter in the opposite ways. Thus, if ρ < 0, it follows im-
mediately that a higher home female home productivity leads to lower optimal
fertility. Of course, home productivity is difﬁcult to measure, and hence, it is not
obvious that this implication is counterfactual. Alternatively, assume wf = ¯ w, i.e.
women are homogenous in their home productivity (e.g. perhaps because more
schooling does not increase productivity in cooking, cleaning, etc.). Then, we still
generate fact (3), while the model has nothing to say about women. But again,
given that home productivity is difﬁcult to assess empirically, this may well be in
line with the facts. This result is summarized as row 2 in Table 3.
In sum then, we see that fertility and wages/home productivities are uncor-
related without the same kinds of assumptions over utility function curvature
that we have identiﬁed in earlier sections. As a substitute, we can generate the
41observed curvature, even with unitary elasticity in preferences, if we move away
from unitary elasticity in the home production technology. But this requires the
right correlation between husband’s wages and wife’s productivity in the home.
Preference Heterogeneity
Nowassume thereisheterogeneityin tastesratherthanproductivities, i.e. house-
holds differ in how much they like children, αn, consumption, αc, and/or the
home good, αh. Going back to Problem (12), the comparative statics of fertility
with respect to preference parameters can immediately be derived from equation
(13). Similarly, one can solve for labor earnings. Note that since the woman does
not work in the market in this version, total household earnings are equal to male
earnings and are given by:








λm + 1] + αℓ
!
.
The results are as follows:55
1. With heterogeneity in αc alone, while (male) earnings are increasing in αc,
fertility is the same for all households.
2. With heterogeneity in αn or αh alone, (male) earnings are the same for all
households while fertility is decreasing in αh and increasing in αn.
3. With simultaneous heterogeneity in αc and αh and a positive correlation of
these preferences within households, fertility will be negatively correlated
with husband’s earnings, fact (3). This ﬁnding hinges on the husband hav-
ing an alternative use of time to market work—leisure in this case. This
case is row 3 in Table 3.
In sum, only the third case (heterogeneity in tastes for all consumption goods,
and positive correlation of these tastes within couples) can generate the negative
income-fertility relationship observed for men. Similar results can be derived in
the examples with general elasticities or home production functions.
55Using a model along the lines of Section 4, these ﬁndings can be generalized to apply to male
wages instead of labor earnings.
426.2.2 Partial Specialization
To capture better the realities of the 20th century, we now allow for more gen-
der symmetry. Women and men both work in the market and there is no home
production. We still assume that only women can raise children. Also, as before,
we add leisure, ℓg. Then, husbands have to allocate their time between work and
leisure, while women’s time is allocated between three activities: working, enjoy-
ing leisure, and child-rearing. This example might be more relevant for the more
recent experience, when women’s labor force participation has been relatively
large.
The gender-speciﬁc utility function is given by
Ug = αcg log(cg) + αng log(n) + αℓg log(ℓg)




s. t. cf + cm ≤ wm(1 − ℓm) + wf(1 − ℓf − b1n)
where ℓf and ℓm are leisure of the female and male respectively and wf and wm
are the respective wages. Each child takes b1 units of female time. Without loss
of generality, assume that λf +λm = 1 and αc +αn+αℓ = 1. Deﬁne W = wf +wm
as total wealth.
Given the assumption of logarithmic utility, we obtain the standard result that





b1wfn = (λm + λf)αnW.











Comparing (15) to the full specialization analogue (13), one can see that the main
difference is that the male wage and the husband’s weight affect optimal fertility
in the partial specialization versions, but not when full specialization is assumed.
With partial specialization, the time allocation of husband and wife is more inter-
dependent since they can, to some extent, substitute tasks between them. This is
technologically infeasible in the full specialization model and hence, male wages
are irrelevant for fertility choices.
Ability Heterogeneity
Suppose households differ in their market wages, wf and wm. We see that fertil-
ity, n∗, is decreasing in the wife’s wage, wf, if the husband’s wage, wm, is held
constant. Further, fertility, n∗, is increasing in the husband’s wage, wm, if the
wife’s wage, wf, is held constant.
Thus, this model is consistent with fact (1) and in line with some authors’
ﬁndings on “fact (2)” (e.g., Blau and van der Klaauw (2007)). What remains to
be seen is conditions under which fact (3), i.e. the negative correlation between


















. That is, it depends on the correlation between husband’s and wife’s
market wages. Depending on the matching pattern, we can distinguish three
cases:
1. Perfectly (positively) correlated wages within couples:






φwm and so n∗ is independent of wm.







in wm if ν < 1 (ν > 1 ). That is, n∗ is increasing in wm for ν < 1 and
44decreasing in wm for ν > 1. Note that ν > 1 means that a 1% increase
in the husband’s wage is associated with a more than 1% increase in
the productivity of his wife.
(c) More generally, assuming matching can be characterized by a deter-
ministic function wf(wm), then n∗ is decreasing in wm if and only if
w′
f(wm)
wf/wm > 1. In words, the elasticity of female wages with respect to
male wages must be larger than one. This seems unlikely. This case is
summarized in row 4 in Table 3.







wf] and so n∗ is increasing as a function of wm.
3. Negatively correlated wages within couples:








D/wm−ν. Again this is increasing in wm.
Thus, this version of the theory is consistent with the fact (1) that the regres-
sion coefﬁcient on wife’s wage is positive, and with the “debated fact (2)” that
the regression coefﬁcient on husband’s income is positive (as in Blau and van der
Klaauw (2007)). But this version is not consistent with a negative partial corre-
lation between husband’s income and fertility (unless the correlation is positive
with ν > 1, which seems unlikely). Thus, simply considering couples does not
remove the need for special assumptions about the curvature on utility as in the
simpler examples above.
Preference Heterogeneity
From equation (15), we can also see the relationship between income and fertility
when the basic source of heterogeneity is in preferences. Thus, for example, if
couples differ in their values of αc and assuming, both αℓ and αn are lower so
that αc + αℓ + αn = 1 for all households, those with higher desire for consump-
tion choose lower leisure (both ℓf and ℓm), and also lower fertility, n∗. Because
of this, those couples with higher αc will have both higher incomes, since they
work more, and lower fertility (row 5, Table 3). Note that we have assumed that
couples are matched perfectly in terms of their preferences.
457 Nannies
So far, the assumption that children take time has been an essential ingredient for
deriving a negative wage-fertility relationship. It is easy to see that with goods
costs only, none of the examples above works. That is, with b0 > 0 and b1 =
0, the negative wage-fertility relationship gets reversed in any of the (working)
examples of Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6.
While it is fairly obvious that children are time-intensive, it is less clear that
it is speciﬁcally the parent’s time that is needed. In fact, outsourcing child care
is quite common, and has been throughout history. Examples include nannies,
au pairs, relatives, wet nurses, and even orphanages.56 In short, these kind of
arrangements mean that even though children take time to raise, this time, in
principle, can be hired. Hence, it is not clear why the price of children should be
higher for high wage people.
In this section we ﬁrst show how, when buying nanny-time is an option,
higher wage parents will choose to have more children in simple models. We
then ask what assumptions would restore the negative wage-fertility relation-
ship, even when hiring nannies is possible. We give one example where a speciﬁc
type of preference heterogeneity gives the desired result.
7.1 An Example with Ability Heterogeneity





s.t. c + wn(1 − γ)b1n ≤ w(1 − γb1n)
where b1n is the total time requirement for raising n children, as before, but the
time cost of children can now be split into parental time, γb1n, or nanny time,
56In the 19thcentury, many poor childrenweresent to orphanages, evenwhen the parentswere
still alive, but too poor to feed the children. In 1853, Charles Loring Brace founded the Children’s
Aid Society, which rescued more than 150,000 abandoned, abused and orphaned children from
the streets of New York City and took them by train to start new lives with families on farms
across the country between 1853 and 1929.
46(1−γ)b1n, where γ ∈ [0,1]. We denote the cost of a nanny by wn per unit of time.
The optimal use of nannies in this example depends on the relative market
wage of nannies vs. parents. As long as w < wn, it is never optimal to hire a
nanny (γ∗ = 1), and hence, this case is analog to our previous analysis of exam-
ples in which children require parental time. On the other hand, when w > wn,
parents prefer to hire a nanny, so that γ∗ = 0. This case is equivalent to examples
where children are a goods cost only, and there we have seen that dn∗/dw ≥ 0. So
while in this example dn∗/dw < 0 is possible, it occurs only in the region where
nannies are irrelevant.
Thus, if some people have market wages that are lower than wages of nannies
and others have higher wages, this model implies a v-shaped wage-fertility rela-
tionship. That is, fertility is downward sloping in wages for people with wages
below the nanny wage and upward sloping thereafter. Recall from Figure 1 how-
ever, that the data do not display such a v-shaped relationship.57
Going one step further, one may ask: what determines the nannies’ wage?
Notice that in this model, everyone is equally productive at child-care. One unit
of time produces (1/b) children. Since this is the case, everyone with a market
ability, w, below the nannies’ wage would be better off becoming a nanny and
raising (1/b) children since leisure is not valued. Everyone with ability above
the nannies’ wage would hire a nanny. The nannies’ wage is then determined
through demand and supply and wn should be the lowest wage observed in the
data. That is, we would observe an increasing relationship between wages and
fertility throughout the income ladder.
One might rephrase the question as follows: why is fertility decreasing in
wages even for those people whose (after-tax) wages are higher than the hourly
cost of day-care or nannies?
There are, of course, several plausible answers to this question, such as the
moral hazard problem involved in child care. Even though, in principle, nannies
can be hired, if there is some effort involved in raising a high quality child, then
57Some authors have argued that at the very top of the income distribution, the fertility-income
relation might be positive. Due to top coding and small samples at the top of the income distri-
butions, these estimates are often statistically insigniﬁcant. Also, if this theory were applied to
such a v-shape, it would mean that nannies are so expensive (either due to high wages or high
tax wedges) that only the top income group ﬁnds it worthwhile hiring nannies. This seems to be
at odds with the evidence as well.
47the incentives for ananny mightbe different from those ofa parent. Ifmonitoring
is costly, parents might optimally choose to do the child-rearing themselves. In
this case, the opportunity cost of a child again is increasing in income. Alterna-
tively, perhaps parents enjoy spending time with their children over and above the
pure utility effect of having children. If people derive pleasure from, say, spend-
ing the weekend with their children, then nannies are a poor substitute for own
child-rearing. To the best ofour knowledge, these ideashave not beenformalized
seriously, yet.58 Also, not everyone is equally productive in raising children, in
particular, if nannies are also teachers. While we believe these are interesting and
potentially promising channels, they are well beyond the scope of this paper, and
are left for future research. In the next subsection, we pursue yet another possi-
bility, based on preference heterogeneity and endogenous wages along the lines
of Section 4.
7.2 A Working Example with Preference Heterogeneity
The idea is that people differ in how much they like “material goods” goods vis-
` a-vis non-material goods such as children and leisure. That is, some people like
a “market-consumption life-style” while others like a “family-leisure life-style”.
Because of these different preferences, the former invest more in human capital
and therefore have a higher wage, while the latter know they will enjoy leisure,
which makes human capital investments less proﬁtable. These are also the peo-
ple who like large families. As we will see in the next example, one can recover
the negative wage-fertility relationship in this set-up even allowing for nannies.
However, the result rests on a particular form of preference heterogeneity across
households. Therefore, rather than seeing this example as a deﬁnite answer to
the question raised at the beginning of this section, we view it as a starting point
for discussion and further research.
Thestarting pointhereistheexampleofSection 4, whereparentsmakeschool-
ingchoicesforthemselves, whichinturn determinetheirwage. Tokeepitsimple,
assume νs = νw = 1. We add one additional good to the utility function: leisure,
58Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2005a) have an indirect way of modeling the idea that parents
like to spend time with children. That is, the value of staying at home can only be enjoyed if the
mother gave birth in the past but has not returned to work since.
48ℓ. As above, each child requires a time input b1. Again, this can be a nanny’s time,
(1 − γ)b1n, or the parent’s time, γb1n, (where γ ∈ [0,1]). In this choice, the parent
takes the nanny’s wage, wn, as given.
The choice problem is:
max
c,n,ℓ,ls,lw,γ
αc log(c) + αn log(n) + αℓ log(ℓ)
s.t. ls + lw + ℓ + γb1n ≤ 1
w = als
c + wn(1 − γ)b1n ≤ wlw
It is easy to see that l∗
s = l∗
w. That is, given the child-care choice, γ, and the leisure
choice, ℓ, this maximizes market income. In terms of the nanny choice, one can
show that an interior choice is never optimal. We therefore solve the problem for
γ = 1 and γ = 0 and show that, assuming people differ in preferences, fertility
and wages are negatively related for both, γ = 1 and γ = 0.59 Finally, we compare
utilities across the two choices and derive the condition on parameters for which
parents optimally hire a nanny.













αℓ + αn + 2αc
This is very similar to the solution in Section 4, except that leisure is an additional
choice variable. All the results go through. In particular, if parents take care of
their children themselves, those who like the consumption good more, i.e. higher
αc relative to αn and αl, will invest more in human capital, ls, and hence have
higher wages, w = als. They will also choose fewer children and less leisure.
In the case where parents choose to outsource child-care, γ = 0, the solution
















αℓ + 2(αc + αn)
Again, suppose that people differ in their preference for the consumption good
αc. Then, time in school, and hence wages, are strictly increasing in αc and fer-
tility is strictly decreasing in αc as long as leisure is not too important (the exact
condition is: 2(αc + αn) > αℓ). Hence, we obtain the negative fertility-wage rela-
tionship even if nannies are hired.









c (αℓ + 2(αn + αc))(αℓ+2(αn+αc))
(αℓ + αn + 2αc)(αℓ+αn+2αc)(αn + αc)(αn+αc)
i 1
αn
The higher one’s ability, a, relative to nanny wages, wn, the more likely it
is that the parent will hire a nanny. This is similar to the logic in the previous
example with the v-shaped (or increasing) fertility wage relationship. What is
different here is that, assuming households differ in αc, fertility and wages will
be negatively related even among those parents who do use nannies, i.e., those
who choose a goods cost rather than a time cost.
Figure 2 illustrates the model graphically. In this example, all households
have the same ability, a, but differ in their preferences, αc. The ﬁgure then plots
optimal choices as a function of αc both conditional on using a nanny or parent-
ing one’s own child. The solid line depicts the solution under the optimal nanny
choice. The ﬁgure shows clearly how fertility decreases and wages increase in
the desire to consume (αc). Once consumption becomes important enough, peo-
ple optimally will use a nanny. At this point, the wage jumps up discretely: the































































Figure 2: Example with Nanny Choice
which directly translates into the wage. Atthis point, consumption jumps up and
leisure jumps down. Fertility falls somewhat, but note that for high αc types, par-
ents who use nannies have higher fertility than they would have had if nannies
did not exist.
The mechanism behind this example is essentially the same as in Section 4.
Peoplewhoputahigherweighton consumption goodswillinvestmoreinschool-
ing, and hencehave higherwages. Atthe same time, theycare lessabout children
and hence have fewer. Note that having leisure in this example iscrucial, because
once nannies become an option, parents allocate their time only between invest-
ing in (own) human capital and working. Given our functional forms, without
leisure (αℓ = 0), the optimal allocation would be l∗
s = l∗
w = 0.5. But then, wages
would no longer differ across people, since independent of the preference pa-
rameters, everyone would make the same schooling choice. Adding leisure al-
lows for an alternative use of time so that optimal schooling, and hence wages,
51actually differ across people with different preferences.60 People who value con-
sumption goods more choose more schooling and less leisure, and therefore have
higher wages. These same people also have fewer children. This logic holds even
when child-care time can be outsourced to nannies, since it is ultimately the rela-
tive dislike of children that drives the low fertility of high wage people, and not
the high time cost of children. Because of this logic, heterogeneity in preferences,
rather than in exogenous ability, is essential for this result. Starting from exoge-
nous ability heterogeneity would lead to very different conclusions, as is obvious
from the solution above (and recalling w = al∗
s): higher a people have both higher
wages and more children.
Of course, the mechanism in this example is probably not the only (or even
the main) reason for why higher wage people choose lower fertility, even when
nannies are an option. Our goal here is to raise an important question and pro-
pose a ﬁrst attempt to answer it. One limitation of the present example is that
nanny quality is not a choice. When nanny quality is an input into child quality,
speciﬁc functional form assumptions are needed to preserve the desired result.
This relates back to the quantity-quality trade-off analyzed in Section 5.
8 Time Series Implications
Throughout most of this paper, we have focused on what kind of theories of
fertility can match the downward sloping fertility-wage relationship observed
in cross-sectional data. We have seen that special assumptions are needed, such
as a high elasticity of substitution between fertility and (parent’s) consumption.
One might want to ask more of such theories. For example, one might want to
know the conditions under which such models could also match the decline in
average fertility over the last century and a half. In other words, which of these
theories can also get the time series facts right, or, how must they be modiﬁed
to do so?61 Our static examples are too stylized to empirically test them in any
60This is similar to the preference heterogeneity examples in the couples section in which the
leisure of the husband generated the desired correlation even if his time was not needed to raise
children.
61One could also ask the opposite question: which of the existing theories of the demographic
transition can generate the cross-sectional fertility facts? Such an analysis is beyond the scope of
52serious fashion. Yet, from Section 2 there emerged several stylized facts and one
way to tackle this question is to see which of the theories can produce a picture
that looks qualitatively like Figure 1. The stylized facts that emerge from this
ﬁgure can be summarized as:
1. Fertility is very high at low wages (about 6).
2. Fertility is very low at high wages (about 2).
3. Fertility is decreasing (and convex) in wages for each cross section.
4. Fertility falls over time, as consecutive cross sections move to the right.
In terms of forcing variables, it is not obvious which exogenous changes over
timetoconsider. Oneobviouschange overthistime periodareincreasesinwages
driven by TFP growth. Another potentially important change is the develop-
ment of education, both through technological change that made human capital
production more efﬁcient and changes in government policies through the (free)
public provision of schooling. Sometimes it is argued that children have become
more costly over time, and so we look at this change as well. The interpretation
of this change, however, is not straightforward.
Below, we show four numerical examples, each based on a different theory
analyzed in the text. Each graph displays four cross-sectional relationships be-
tween income and fertility. Depending on the example, the difference between
people within a cross section (i.e., on one line) is either wages or preferences,
while the difference between different cross sections (i.e. between the four differ-
ent lines) is either wages, schooling technology, and/or child rearing costs.
The ﬁrst two ﬁgures are based on two different examples from Section 3. Fig-
ure 3 isbasedon Problem (3)while Figure 4isbased on Problem (4), both variants
of the simplest “price of time theory.”62 In each case, the only difference across
people (both in the cross section and over time) is wages. Both examples match
the stylized facts described above fairly well. Thus, as long as one is willing to
this paper.
62The main qualitative difference between the two examples is that the income elasticity is
constant in Figure 4, while it is increasing in absolute value in Figure 3. Recall also that the
empirical elasticity appears to slightly decrease over this time horizon (as shown in Table 1).


























Figure 3: Time Series based on price of time example, σ < 1, increasing wages

























Figure 4: Time Series in example with non-homothetic utility, increasing wages





















medium wages and d
0 up
high wages + d
0 even higher
highest wages + d
1 up
Figure 5: Time Series based on Quantity-Quality example
assume a high elasticity of substitution between parent’s consumption and fer-
tility, the basic theory seems to work well—at least in this simple formulation.
Once one moves to a truly dynamic formulation, where parents have preferences
over their children’s utility, the same logic no longer holds, as we discuss in Ap-
pendix A.1. The intuition is simple: when wages go up, both parents’ and chil-
dren’s wages are affected. Thus, while the opportunity cost of having a child is
higher for richer parents, the beneﬁt of having a child also increases (because the
wage of a child of a rich parent is also high). Thus, even though these results
seem like strong successes for the theory at ﬁrst glance, there are other reason-
able, but more stringent, requirements for which their success is more limited.
Figure 5 considers the quantity-quality trade-off example from Problem (7)
with f(s) = d0 + d1s. Note that to distinguish this example from the ﬁrst two
pictures, this assumes log-utility, and all curvature comes in through the child
quality production function only. In this example, fertility is essentially hyper-
bolic in wages, and hence the shape of the curve does not match Figure 1 very
well.63 However, this example lends itself to think about potential changes in
63One way of stating the qualitative differencebetween Figure 5 and the data is that the income
elasticity of fertility in the example converges to zero very fast as wages increase, while in the
























low TFP, low cost
medium TFP, medium cost
high TFP, high cost
highest TFP, highest cost
Figure 6: Time Series based on increasing TFP and increasing cost of children,
cross section due to preference heterogeneity
the education sector. In addition to increasing wages, consecutive cross sections
in Figure 5 face different quality production functions. In particular, the sec-
ond cross section has a higher d0 which one could interpret as the introduction
of elementary public education. The third cross section has an even higher d0
which might represent a further expansion of the public education system. The
last cross section has a higher d1, which is a parameter that determines the re-
turns to parental education inputs. This could be interpreted as improvements
in education technology. Alternatively, without this last change in the child qual-
ity production function, the last cross section would simply be a continuation of
the third cross section, converging to 2.14 children (in this example) as wages go
to inﬁnity. So while this picture matches Figure 1 qualitatively, more work on
the underlying changes in education technology (i.e., their historical analogues)
would be required before one could call this theory a success.
Finally, Figure 6 is based on the preference heterogeneity example from Sec-
tion 4. In this Figure the cross section and time series both slope downward,
but the mechanisms behind the two are different. The cross section is based on
preference heterogeneity. That is, people who like children invest less in market-
data, the elasticity is roughly constant.
56speciﬁc human capital and therefore have lower wages, while those who put a
higher weight on consumption goods do the opposite and therefore have higher
wages. Over time, as in the examples above, we assume that average productiv-
ity, a, goes up. However, in this example, increases in productivity do not affect
fertility decisions. Hence, without more bells and whistles (e.g. changing the
curvature to the utility function), this example will not lead to falling fertility for
consecutive cross sections. Thus, we have added a second channel to the time se-
ries in the ﬁgure: increases in child costs—i.e. the units of time required per child
increase exogenously over time. This picture looks roughly like the data, but its
interpretation is not clear, i.e. what is the real world analogue of an increase in
child-rearing costs (measured in units of time)? 64
These simple examples are only meant to spur thinking about the possibili-
ties of the models examined in this paper. Much more work in carefully calibrat-
ing/estimating the relevant parameters and documenting the needed changes in
the forcing variables, is necessary before any ﬁnal conclusions can be drawn. In
the end, we cannot offer a clear answer to our own question, but we hope that
the ideas here will stimulate further research leading to a better understanding
of fertility decision-making.
9 Conclusion
We have investigated the ability of fertility theories to match the cross-sectional
relationship between fertility and income. The main focus has been on compar-
ing two sets of theories, one in which ability heterogeneity causes fertility differ-
ences and another in which heterogeneity in the taste for children causes income
differences. Several interesting ﬁndings emerge and are summarized in Table 2.
In particular, we ﬁnd that low incomes cause high fertility only if the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and the number of children is high. Empirical
research estimating this elasticity would be desirable.
Theories based on taste heterogeneity, on the other hand, do not require any
64One rationale for this change may be the progressive introduction of child labor laws. That
is, while the time cost remained the same, the time that children contribute to the household’s
income decreases. Hence, this would be equivalent to a net increase in the time cost.
57elasticity assumptions. The mechanism causing the negative income-fertility re-
lationship is a very different one, and does not depend on the relative sizes of in-
come and substitution effects. Thus, one may conclude that taste-based theories
are more robust. Another advance of taste-based theories is that the assumption
of parental time as a critical input into child production is not necessarily needed.
One may also require theories to generate simultaneously a negative income
andchildqualityrelationship. Whilethisfollowsimmediatelyfrom ability-driven
stories, the result is somewhat harder to generate within the class of taste-driven
stories. Whether 2-parent versions of these theories can generate male wages
to be negatively correlated with fertility depends on the details of the models.
Generally speaking, with additional assumptions, both classes of theories can
do so. However, these both require speciﬁc assumptions about how spouses are
matched, or about how male and female inputs are combined in family produc-
tion. In particular, taste-based stories require assortative matching along prefer-
ence lines, while ability-driven stories require assortative matching (or comple-
mentarities in production) in abilities. Finally, one may ask whether the same
driving force that explains the cross-section can also generate the time trend.
This is a relatively easy task to accomplish for ability-based stories, because liter-
ally the same force that causes richer people to have fewer children in the cross-
section also operates as incomes go up for everyone, and thereby mechanically
causes a demographic transition. It seems clear that the same mechanism will not
be able to generate a demographic transition in taste-based theories, unless one
believes that tastes for children declined systematically over time.
In some ways, the analysis in thispaperraisesmore questions than itanswers.
It points to several directions for further research, both theoretical as well as em-
pirical. On the empirical side, estimates of the elasticity of substitution between
own consumption and children (and child quality vs. quantity) would be useful.
More generally, clever ways of empirically estimating the contribution of taste-
based vs. ability-based theories in explaining the negative fertility-income cor-
relation would be valuable. One such attempt is provided in Amialchuk (2006)
who uses PSID data and ﬁnds that in response to income shocks (speciﬁcally, job
displacements), couples do not change their lifetime fertility in a signiﬁcant way.
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variation in fertility (due to twins) on parents’ labor supply and ﬁnd little effect.
To the extent that human capital is accumulated on the job, this ﬁnding can be
interpreted as showing a negligible causal effect from fertility shocks to income.
It does not, however, invalidate theories based on preference heterogeneity for
consumption goods vis-` a-vis children. Clearly, further empirical research to test
the various theories needed.
In addition, a better empirical understanding of the spousal matching pro-
cess would be helpful. While assortative mating in education has long been doc-
umented in the data (for example Pencavel (1998)), assortative mating in pref-
erences has received less attention. Recent research estimating preferences for
marriage markets (e.g. Ariely, Hitsch, and Hortacscu (2006) and Lee (2008) ) may
prove useful for understanding better why higher income men have fewer chil-
dren even though, typically, theirwives domost ofthe child-rearing. Isit because
high ability men tend to marry high ability women? Or is it because men with
a preference for consumption goods tend to marry women with similar prefer-
ences, leading them to spend most of their income on material goods and less on
59children accordingly?
New research should also develop models of fertility that allow parents to
outsource childcare. All successful theories of fertility rely on the assumption
that it takes the parents’ time to raise children. Alternative child care options ex-
ist, yet, as soon as child care can be bought in the market, the time cost becomes
a goods cost for the parents. However, models with only goods cost cannot gen-
erate a negative income fertility relationship (with one very speciﬁc exception).
More theoretical research would be of interest here. For example, modeling ex-
plicitly that nannies require monitoring, which in itself may be time-intensive,
could be a promising avenue to pursue.
Finally, we found that expanding the successful models to full dynamic ver-
sions based on parental altruism is very challenging. Dynamic models are very
important for understanding the connection between cross-sectional fertility dif-
ferences and the demographic transition. More research in this area is needed.
60A Appendix
A.1 Adding Parental Altruism
To this point, our focus has been on examining simple models of fertility choice
that give rise to the observed pattern in the cross section with respect to income.
As we have seen, there are several examples that are capable of this, though they
differ in their details. One property that is missing from all of the examples in the
main text, however, is altruism of parents towards their children. That is, parents
are made happy by things that increase the utility of their children. Altruism in-
troduces an additional dynamic aspect to the fertility choice automatically: when
choosing their own fertility levels, parents must forecast the utility levels of their
own children. Following this logic, the utility of the children will depend on the
utility levels of their own children – i.e., the grandchildren – and so forth. That
is, the utility of the current period decision maker depends on the entire future
evolution of the path of consumption and fertility, not just the levels chosen this
period.
Although thistasksoundscomplex, modelsoffertility choicebasedonparental
altruism of this form have been worked out in detail in Becker and Barro (1988)
and Barro and Becker (1989). Here we develop a simple version of the Barro-
Becker model (B-B henceforth) and discuss its relationship with the examples
developed in the main text. We show that the simple example discussed in Sec-
tion 3 can be interpreted as the problem solved by the typical parent under a
setting with dynastic altruism, but that this requires some extra assumptions and
has some additional implications. In particular, the simple, static problem with
homothetic preferences can be interpreted as the problem from the Bellman’s
equation for the fully dynamic model where the term relating to fertility choice
corresponds to the value function for continuation payoffs. However, this inter-
pretation has the additional implication that the value function also depends on
the wage, and because of this, has the property that families with different base
wage rates all make the same fertility choices. Thus, although the high elasticity
homothetic example has the correct cross-sectional property in the static exam-
ple, this property does not extend to the fully dynamic version of the model.
In the simplest version of the B-B model, the time t parent solves:
61maxct,nt u(ct) + βg(nt)Ut+1,
subject to: ct + θtnt ≤ wt,
where ct is current period consumption, nt is the fertility choice, and Ut+1 is
the utility level of the typical child. Assuming that g(n) = nη, u(c) = c1−σ/(1 −
σ), successively substituting and changing to aggregate variables for all of the
descendants of a given time 0 household, the equilibrium sequence of choices







t /(1 − σ)
Subject to:
Ct + θtNt+1 ≤ wtNt,
N0 given,
where Ct is aggregate consumption in period t, Nt is the number of adults in
period t, θt is the cost of producing a child and wt is the wage rate. Implicit in this
formulation is the assumption that each adult has the same level of consumption
Ct
Nt = ct in any period.
For this problem to satisfy the typical monotonicity and concavity restrictions
some restrictions on σ and η must be satisﬁed. There are two sets of parameter
choices that satisfy these requirements. The ﬁrst is the original assumption in
Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989): 0 ≤ η + σ − 1 < 1, 0 <
1 − σ < 1 and 0 < η = η + σ − 1 + 1 − σ < 1. In this case U > 0 for all (N,C) ∈
R2
+. The second possibility is one which allows for intertemporal elasticities of
substitution in line with the standard growth and business cycle literature: σ > 1,
η +σ −1 ≤ 0. In this case, utility is negative and η < 0. When η = 1−σ (allowed
under both conﬁgurations), utility becomes a function of aggregate consumption
only.65
There are two types of situations under which this maximization problem
becomes a stationary dynamic program (where the state variable is N). Both
65This formulation for the dynasty utility ﬂow gives rise to some very useful simpliﬁcations
that we will exploit below. One disadvantage of it, however, is that it is not equivalent to loga-
rithmic utility when σ = 1. However, when η = 1 − σ and σ → 1, the preferences, will converge
to those given by the utility function
P
βt log(Ct). See Bar and Leukhina (2007) for an explicit
derivation of Barro-Becker preferences with an IES equal to one.
62cases require constant growth in wages – wt = γt
ww0. The ﬁrst is when the cost
of children is in terms of goods, and this cost grows at the same rate as wages –
θt = aγt
w. The second case is when the cost of having a child is in terms of time
only, θt = b1twt where b1t is the amount of time it takes to raise one surviving
child.
In eitherof these cases, theproblem ofthe dynasty overall hasahomogeneous
of degree one constraint set and an objective function that is homogeneous of
degree η. Because of this structure, it follows that the solution to the sequence
problem has several useful properties that we will exploit below.
Following the discussion in Section 3, it follows that only the time cost case is
capable of matching the facts from the cross section and hence, we will limit our
attention to this case.
Under the special case that η = 1 − σ, it follows that the value function for
this problem, V (N) is homogeneous of degree 1 − σ in N – V (N) = V (1)N1−σ.
Because of this fact, it follows that, after detrending, Bellman’s equation for this
problem can be written as:
V (N) = sup
{C,N′}
C
1−σ/(1 − σ) + ˆ βV (1)N
′(1−σ)
s.t. C + θN
′ ≤ wN
where ˆ β = βγη
w. V (1) can be found explicitly. It is given by:
V (1) =
(w + θ(π − γN))1−σ
(1 − σ)(1 − βγ
η
Nγ1−σ)
It follows that the solution to the dynastic problem has a representation in






t /(1 − σ) + ˆ βV (1)n
1−σ
t
s.t. ct + θtnt ≤ wt
Note that this problem is similar to the CES utility function problem laid out
in Section 3.2. However, there is one important difference. The coefﬁcient on
63fertility cannot be chosen freely. In particular, it is easy to see that V (1) depends
on the wage. Indeed, it follows directly that it is increasing in the wage. Because
of this, it follows that the results from the comparative statics concerning the
dependence of fertility on the wage are not necessarily valid. In the dynamic
version of the problem both the objective function (i.e., Bellman’s Equation) and
the constraints depend on the wage.

























where the last equality follows from assuming that all costs of children are in
terms of time, θ0 = b1w0.
It follows that fertility choices are independent of the level of wages of the
family. Thus, although it seems as if the time cost case can reproduce the cross
sectional properties of fertility choice (when σ < 1 is assumed), this is not true
once one restricts attention to static problems that have a dynamic rationaliza-
tion.66
We can also use this framework to get some idea about the implications for
differences in fertility across families when preferences for children are the basic
source of heterogeneity. For example, we can see that if families differ in their
levels of patience, β, differences in the cross section are preserved in the time
series. Thus, for example, if for two families, i and i′, we have that βi > βi′,
it follows that nit > ni′t for all t. Thus, the cross sectional variation in fertility
choice is preserved in the time series.67 It should be noted however, that this
will also have the implication that families with higher fertility also have higher
66Here we have assumed that wage differences across families are permanent – i.e., if i and
i′ represent two distinct families then we are assuming that
wit+1
wi′t+1 = wit
wi′t = γw. An interesting
question is whether this result will be overturned when one moves away from this assumption.
Jones and Schoonbroodt (2007b) ﬁnd that a high growth rate lowers fertility if σ > 1 and vice-
versa (see also Equation 16). This suggests that with intergenerational mean reversion in income,
poor households expect a high income growth rate and would have more children than rich ones
as long as σ < 1. In this context, Zhao (2008) uses a model with ﬁlial altruism as in Boldrin and
Jones (2002) where mean reversion is crucial, both in the cross section and over time (when social
security crowds out fertility). We leave the analysis of intermediate cases (i.e. partially correlated
dynastic incomes) to future research.
67As above, this assumes that the differences across families is permanent – βit > βi′t for all t.
64savings rates. This probably does not hold in the cross section.
A.2 A Dynamic Version of the Endogenous Wage Example
Next, we develop a version of the endogenous wage model in Section 4 that is
consistent with parental altruism as in the B-B model.
Assume that the resource constraints are given by those of problem (6), but
assume that νs + νw = 1. (To simplify notation, write νs = ν and νw = 1 − ν.)
Using capital letters to denote aggregate quantities (i.e. deﬁning Lt ≡ Ntlt etc.),
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As above, the constraint correspondence is homogeneous of degree 1 and the
utility function is homogeneous of degree η in initial condition N0. Assuming
that η = 1 − σ as above, the value function is of the form V (N) = V (1)N1−σ. It
follows that the Bellman Equation is:
V (N) = sup
C,N′
C
1−σ/(1 − σ) + βV (1)N
′(1−σ)







So for the appropriate choice of αn and αc, the solution to problem (6) can be
interpreted as the solution to the dynamic problem (17) with N0 = 1 in some
cases. Here, normalizing αc = 1, it follows that αn = βV (1).
It is not clear in this framework exactly which comparative statics exercise
corresponds to the one in Section 4, where αn is increased. In principle, it could
correspond either to an increase in β, or to any increase that makes V (1) larger.
In what follows, we consider only the implications of increases, across dynasties,
65of increases in β’s.
Using the ﬁrst order conditions to the problem in sequence form and simpli-
fying, we obtain a characterization of the balanced growth path dynamics. The
system isdetermined bythe division of time between schooling andworking and







That is, fertility is increasing in β. Because of this fact, it follows that both
Lst
Nt and Lwt
Nt are decreasing in β, and hence, fertility and income (or wages) are
negatively related as desired.
Thus, for the endogenous wage example, anexplicit dynastic form can bepro-
vided that is still consistent with the cross-sectional facts. There are still some is-
sues here, however. Foremost, when discount factors differ across agents, strong
forces for borrowing and lending are typically present. The analysis here ignores
these considerations. It is not certain that the results will be robust to this exten-
sion. 68
A.3 Summary of Findings for Couples’ Models
In Table 3 we summarize the sets of assumptions that are able to generate both a
negative correlation between husband’s as well as wife’s income and fertility.
68Another issue not considered here is variants of intergenerational persistence in preferences.
66Table 3: Couples: Model Versions that Work
Specialization Exogenous Curvature Spousal (1) (2) (3)








DATA < 0 mixed < 0
1 full§ ability σ < 1 corr(wf,wm) > 0 < 0 = 0 < 0
2 full§ ability σ = 1 wf = ¯ w ρ < 0♯ n/a∗∗ < 0 < 0
3 full§ taste any σ prefs matching leisure < 0∗ n/a♭ < 0∗
4 partial ability σ = 1 w′
f(wm)wm
wf > 1 < 0 > 0 < 0
5 partial taste any σ prefs matching leisure < 0∗ n/a♭ < 0∗
∗ The correlation here is for earnings not wages, but including schooling as in Section 4 will extend the results to wages.
∗∗ All women have the same productivity in this example, hence the correlation ∂n/∂wf is not well-deﬁned.
§ In the full specialization version wf refers to female productivity at home and cannot be compared directly
to data on female wages.
♯ Market goods and female time are complements in home production.
♭ The conditional correlation will depend on the details of the matching process. With perfectly aligned preferences,
there is no residual variation in the husband’s wage/earnings, conditional on the wife’s wage/earnings.
Hence the conditional correlation is not well-deﬁned in the model analyzed in the paper.References
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